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 1 
Introduction 
 
I. Value is a Substance/Essence 
In this thesis, I will examine the analysis of the “theory of value” in economics, put 
forward by economist André Orléan in The Empire of Value. In doing so, I will 
demonstrate the contribution that The Empire of Value makes to the school of thought 
that I name Heterodox Economic Methodology1. Appendices A and B reproduce the 
essential extracts of Orléan’s analysis in, respectively, the French original and 
translated into English2. These appendices have been included to provide readers with 
an exposure to Orléan’s analysis independent of my interpretation.  
By “theory of value”, Orléan is referring to both the conception of value that 
underpins orthodox economics, the utility theory of value, and that which has 
informed classical and heterodox traditions of economics, the labour theory of value. 
Orléan justifies this grouping together of what are often considered opposing theories 
by claiming that they conceptualise value in exactly the same manner. The labour and 
utility theories of value employ a common method: they attempt to measure value 
objectively by a pre-determined scale. Consequently, Orléan argues, they conceive of 
the ontology – the philosophy of being – of value as a Substance/Essence.3 By this he 
means that both theories, through a method of a priori objectivity, attribute the 
existence of value to a universal force that pre-exists exchange. The value of a 
commodity can be known prior to the exchange process. Therefore, when value is 
conceived of in this way, the market relation is pre-determined and social relations are 
ignored (Orléan, 2011, pp.22-23). Orthodox economics and the classical tradition of 
economics, including its heterodox inheritors, such as Karl Marx, believe in the same 
ontology of value. Value, in economics, is a Substance/Essence.  
 Orléan takes a normative stance with regard to the identification of this 
common ontological position. He states that, “I refuse to accept that market value can 
                                                
1 I use the term “Heterodox Economic Methodology” to refer to the work of Tony Lawson (1997, 2003, 
2006, 2012, 2013) and others such as Sheila Dow (1998, 2012). This group of scholars have many 
commonalities but use different nomenclature. I have adopted the terminology and prescriptions used 
by Lawson.  
2 The English translation reproduced is a working translation. See Orléan (2013). 
3 Substance/Essence, for the purpose of this thesis, should be understood as an a priori and universal 
ontology. It is a state of being of the same nature as a god.   
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be identified with a substance […] that pre-exists exchange”4. A Substance/Essence 
ontology of value is not representative of reality (Orléan, 2011, p.53). In reality, value 
is an Institution (Orléan, 2011, p.44)5. However, Orléan does not elaborate, other than 
in reference to, most notably, Marx and Émile Durkheim, his conception of reality.  
Heterodox economic approaches, in general, argue for their supremacy over 
orthodox approaches in the same manner as Orléan, on the grounds that they present 
an analysis of economic phenomena that reflects a more realistic picture of the world. 
In other words, heterodox economics claims to be “realist” and accuses orthodox 
economics of being unrealistic. This reality, however, is not a consensual matter. It is 
a philosophical position that must be defined. To claim “realism” requires a definition 
of reality with which one’s theory can be compared. It is for this reason that 
Heterodox Economic Methodology argues that, “heterodox economics is, in the first 
instance, an orientation in ontology” (Lawson, 2006, p.498). “Realism” can only be 
claimed with regard to a conception of reality. Ontology is this conception of reality. 
However, heterodox economic approaches, including Orléan in The Empire of Value, 
often fail to explicitly their conception of ontology.  
Heterodox Economic Methodology is a “realist” approach, not in the sense of 
the orthodoxy of political science, but where: 
 
[R]ealism […] is closely and explicitly bound up with ontology […] i.e. with 
enquiry into the nature of being, of existence, including the nature, constitution 
and structure of the objects of study. Indeed, it is a forthright concern with 
ontology, and in particular with elaborating the broad nature of aspects of 
natural and social reality, that explains […] the term realism being used. […] 
[T]he term realism is used here to denote specific accounts of the nature of 
reality (Lawson, 1997, pp.15-16). 
 
To avoid confusion with the orthodoxy of political science, I will denote “realist” and 
“realism” with inverted commas. “Realism”, as it will be used and understood in this 
thesis, prescribes the necessity of, first, when theorising, defining one’s ontology. In 
                                                
4 « nous refusons d'admettre que la valeur marchande puisse s'identifier à une substance […] qui 
préexiste aux échanges » (Orléan, 2011, p.12).  
5 An Institutional ontology, for the purpose of this thesis, refers to an ontology of social structures that 
conceives of them as socially constructed and socio-historically specific.  
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this way, reality is defined before theorising takes place and any ensuing theories can, 
by respecting this definition of reality, be “realist”. 
Therefore, my first task in this thesis is to propose an ontology consistent with 
Orléan’s argument that Substance/Essence is an unacceptable ontology for a social 
object, in this case value. My analysis explicitly follows that of Tony Lawson (1997, 
2003, 2006, 2012, 2013) and is also informed by Sheila Dow (1998, 2012).   
 Once I have provided an ontology for Orléan’s analysis of the “theory of 
value” – conforming with the framework of Heterodox Economic Methodology – I 
will turn to his theory in earnest. My second task in this thesis is to analyse Orléan’s 
identification of a more general unrealistic ontology, that of value being a 
Substance/Essence. This ontology crosses the boundaries of orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy and is an observation hitherto missed by Heterodox Economic 
Methodology. I will demonstrate that Orléan’s theory, complete with its ontological 
foundation, has important implications for Heterodox Economic Methodology, which 
I will elaborate. This analysis forces a wade into some philosophical shallows. I will 
now define the philosophical terms that I will employ to structure this thesis.  
 
II. Definitions 
I acknowledge at the outset that the definitions that I have developed may seem 
simplistic. This is intended to create sufficient clarity that the argument may be 
developed within the confines of this thesis.  
 First, the branch of philosophy that will be dealt with exclusively is that which 
Lawson (1997) names social ontology. Social ontology is the philosophy of the nature 
of social reality. As I conceive of it, this ontology deals with two ontologically 
different entities, human beings and social structures, which different social 
ontologies conceive of with varying degrees of interconnectedness. The categories I 
employ, though they have wider meaning in philosophy, literary theory, and art 
history, are defined specifically with regard to social ontology. 
 The categories are Substance/Essence, Institution, Modernism, and 
Postmodernism. Substance/Essence and Institution both refer to the ontology of social 
structures. Modernism and Postmodernism are philosophical paradigms that I define 
with regard to the social ontology that each paradigm presupposes as “real”.  
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 Orléan uses Castoriadis’ definition of Substance/Essence, which “signifies a 
quality ‘endowed with absolute signification’, something that ‘has always existed, 
forever [until now] and forever more’” (Cited in Orléan, 2013, p.45). In other words, 
a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures implies the belief that social 
structures are universal and pre-exist the social relations in which they are manifested. 
This ontology is deterministic, ignoring the human dimension of social ontology. A 
Substance/Essence ontology was originally conceptualised as the nature of a god.  
 Orléan uses, for Institution, the definition written by Paul Fauconnet and 
Marcel Mauss (1901). 
 
What is an institution if not a fully formed set of acts and ideas that 
individuals find themselves faced with and that more or less imposes itself on 
them? There is no reason to reserve this term exclusively for fundamental 
social arrangements, as is usually done. We therefore also intend by it customs 
and fashions, prejudices and superstitions, as well as essential legal structures 
and political forms or organisation; for all these phenomena are of the same 
nature and differ only in degree. (Cited in Orléan, 2013, p.495) 
 
Institution, used in this manner, implies an ontology of social structures that 
conceives of them as socially constructed and socio-historically specific. The reality 
of social structures is attributed to groups of human beings who have constructed 
them and are required to continually reproduce them. However, Institutions are 
conceived of as being qualitatively independent from the individuals on whom their 
reality depends and, in addition, are observed to have a conditioning power over these 
human beings. “Institution” signifies a social ontology: an ontology of 
interconnection between social structures and human beings.  
 I define Modernism as the philosophical paradigm in which the reality of 
social structures is that they are Substances/Essences. Social structures are, in this 
paradigm, universal and determine the social existence of human beings. This 
paradigm constructed western thought from the enlightenment until the middle of the 
twentieth century (Castoriadis, 1978, pp.314-315; Sartre, 1970).  
 I define Postmodernism as the paradigm in which, in reality, the social realm 
is constituted by socially constructed, socio-historically specific, and conditioning 
Institutions. I claim it to be the current philosophical paradigm. The reality of the 
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social realm is one in which human beings and social structures are completely 
interconnected and presuppose each other, but where neither can be completely 
defined or explained by the other.   
 In summary, the philosophical framework of social ontology to be employed 
in this thesis opposes a modern social ontology, where social structures are 
Substances/Essences, with a postmodern social ontology, where Institutions constitute 
social reality.  
 
III. Structure 
Heterodox Economic Methodology has two tenets. First, one must define reality. 
Second, methodology must be understood with respect to reality. Therefore, in this 
thesis I will answer two questions: 
 
1. What is a strong ontological foundation for Orléan’s assertion in The 
Empire of Value that a Substance/Essence ontology of value is unrealistic and 
that, in reality, value is an Institution?    
 
2. What are the methodological implications of this ontology? 
 
This will be done to, first, make Orléan’s work conform to the requirements of 
Heterodox Economic Methodology and, second, demonstrate the contribution that 
The Empire of Value makes to this school of thought.  
 In Chapter One I outline the framework of Heterodox Economic 
Methodology. I demonstrate the manner in which Orléan proceeds, without prior 
knowledge of this approach, for the most part, in accordance with the requirements of 
this framework. 
 In Chapter Two I outline the argument, developed by Orléan in The Empire of 
Value, that value is not a Substance/Essence. This argument is built on the 
identification of a fundamental unrealistic ontology in economics; an ontology that 
Heterodox Economic Methodology has not yet observed. I demonstrate, however, that 
an ontological foundation is lacking from Orléan’s theory.  
 In Chapter Three I propose, based on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre (1960, 
1968, 1970), an existentialist ontological foundation for Orléan’s theory. I 
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demonstrate that this social ontology is largely similar to that of Lawson. The 
implication of this ontology is that the social ontology informing both Orléan and 
Lawson finds itself on the postmodern side of the paradigmatic divide defined above. 
The ontology of Heterodox Economic Methodology is postmodern social ontology. 
 In Chapter Four I analyse the proposals of Orléan, Sartre and Lawson as to the 
methodological implications of their common ontological position. The general 
methodological implication is pluralism. I demonstrate that each theorist’s inferred 
pluralist methodology is insufficient to guarantee “realism”. I argue that this results 
from a lack of recognition as to the paradigmatic nature of reality. With this 
paradigmatic specificity in mind, I propose an alternative, for guaranteeing “realism”, 
to the a priori definition of methodological principles.  
 The reality defined by Heterodox Economic Methodology has not always 
been. To state that value is an Institution is to break with the reality of the past. In this 
thesis, I will demonstrate that Heterodox Economic Methodology is, in fact, on the 
front line of a paradigm shift. 
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Chapter One 
 
Heterodox Economic Methodology 
 
1.1 Heterodox Economics 
Heterodox Economic Methodology is a heterodox approach to economics. Generally, 
heterodox economics can be characterised as a two-part process. What renders 
economics unique amongst the social sciences is the extent to which its mainstream, 
which I will refer to as orthodox economics, is monolithic in character, dogmatic in 
method, and dismissive of alternative approaches to the understanding of economic 
phenomena. All economics must consequently be undertaken with reference to it. 
Therefore, the first part of the research process of heterodox economics involves 
developing a critique of orthodox economics. This has been done on countless 
occasions and in manners so convincing that it is often with disbelief that the 
heterodoxy observes the continuing strength of its adversary. That being said, once 
the orthodoxy has been resoundingly defeated – at least logically – the second step for 
heterodox research is to elaborate alternatives to purportedly better, that is, more 
realistically, explain economic phenomena. As a heterodox approach, Heterodox 
Economic Methodology follows this same path. What identifies it from other 
heterodox approaches is its attempt to complete this analysis at an increased level of 
abstraction, that is, at the level of methodology. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
The understanding of the term “methodology” that will inform this thesis is one that 
deems it to be meta-theory. Methodology is the theory of theories. More specifically, 
the understanding that I carry of methodology refers to the manner in which one may 
understand what informs theorists when they embark on the understanding of a 
phenomenon. In other words, methodology is understanding the approach a theorist 
takes to theorising. The elements that I take to inform and constitute methodology are 
ontology, epistemology and method. Ontology, the philosophy of being, and 
epistemology, the philosophy of knowledge, are the philosophical underpinnings of 
an approach, that is, the worldview of the theorist. Method, then, is the technique 
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employed by the theorist in investigating their chosen phenomenon. Methodology is 
the combination of ontology, epistemology, and method. Importantly, I assume that 
there is consistency between ontology, epistemology and method such that inferences 
about the other constitutive elements may be made from the knowledge of one. In 
addition, I conceive of the elements that constitute methodology in a hierarchy with 
regard to their proximity to reality. First comes ontology, as it is the study of being 
and thus provides a theory with its conception of reality. Secondly, there is 
epistemology that, on the basis of this ontology, determines what it is possible to 
know. Finally there is method that attempts, through techniques, to investigate and 
create knowledge within the constraints of a predefined epistemology.  
 
1.3 Heterodox Economic Methodology 
Heterodox Economic Methodology, like any heterodox approach, has two parts. The 
difference made by its increased level of abstraction is that these parts have wide 
reaching implications. Hence, in part one, a general normative framework for 
analysing theories can be inferred from the critique of the orthodox economics. In part 
two, a project to build a general methodology for social science is inferred from the 
proposal of an alternative, more realistic, perspective.   
Through Lawson’s (1997, 2003, 2006, 2012, 2013) analysis of the 
methodology of orthodox economics, I infer a three step normative framework for 
analysing social theory more generally. Lawson (2006, p.489) proposes that, “modern 
mainstream economics is just the reliance on certain forms of mathematical 
(deductivist) method”. What defines orthodox economics, according to Lawson, is the 
universal application of the mathematical-deductivist method. Lawson (2013, p.950) 
defines deductivism as, “just the doctrine that all explanation be expressed in terms of 
‘laws’ or ‘uniformities’ interpreted as (actual or ‘hypothetical’) correlations or event 
regularities”. The method of orthodox economics uses deductive reasoning, 
formalised by mathematical modelling. The use of this method results from a 
misguided application of the misunderstood methods of the natural sciences to the 
social realm (Lawson, 1997, 2003). This is step one: the approach to be critiqued is 
defined by method. 
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[A]ll methods have ontological presuppositions or preconditions, that is 
conditions under which their usage is appropriate. To use any research method 
is immediately to presuppose a worldview of sorts. […] [M]ethods of 
mathematical-deductivist modelling, like all methods, do have ontological 
presuppositions. (Lawson, 2003, p.12)  
 
Knowledge of this mathematical-deductivist method permits the inference of the 
constitutive elements of the theorist’s worldview: epistemology and ontology. The 
epistemology implied is positivist, that is, facts may be known. As for ontology, 
Lawson (2006, p.495) states that “the ontological presuppositions of the insistence on 
mathematical modelling include the restriction that the social domain is everywhere 
constituted by sets of isolated atoms”. Furthermore:  
 
The term “atom” here refers to anything that (if triggered) has the same 
independent effect whatever the context. Formulations couched in terms of 
atomistic factors allow the deduction and/or prediction of events. Or rather, 
they do so if nothing is allowed to interfere with the actions of the atoms. So 
to guarantee that at the theory level outcomes are truly predictable and/or 
deducible, the atoms must be assumed to act in isolation from any 
countervailing factors that could interfere with the outcomes. (Lawson, 2013, 
p.954)  
 
The ontology implied by the universal application of the mathematical-deductivist 
method is that human beings are isolated atoms. This is proven as, for the 
mathematical-deductivist models of orthodox economics to be able to produce laws, 
their constitutive elements must be predictable, as only isolated atoms are. As the 
constitutive elements of economic models are purportedly human beings, these 
models presuppose an ontology of isolated atoms. This is step two: ontology and 
epistemology are inferred from method.  
However, as any human being will tell you, in reality, we are not isolated 
atoms. The critique developed of orthodox economics is simply that the ontology it 
presupposes does not correspond to social reality:  
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[A] world of isolated atoms […] may actually be rather rare in the social 
realm. I draw this conclusion on the basis of an (a posteriori derived) theory 
of social ontology, a conception of the nature of the material of social reality 
[…]. […] By social reality or the social realm, I mean that domain of all 
phenomena whose existence depends at least in part on us. (Lawson, 2006, 
p.495)  
 
This is step three: a theory’s presupposed ontology is judged with regard to its 
proximity to social reality.  
In summary, the normative framework established analyses theory by 
inferring its presupposed ontology. This ontology is then compared to reality. The 
requirement of the framework is that theory be “realist”. Ontology must correspond to 
reality.  
It is here that Heterodox Economic Methodology transitions from the first part 
of heterodox research, the critique of orthodox economics, and in this case, a general 
framework for judging theories, to the second part, the elaboration of an alternative 
perspective, in this case, the general methodological principles for understanding the 
social realm. This transition is made by way of the fundamental requirement for 
completing the normative framework outlined above: a definition of social reality. In 
this case, what is Lawson’s a posteriori derived theory of social ontology?  
 
The conception of the social world to be sustained is of a network of 
continually reproduced inter-dependencies. That is, social reality is conceived 
as intrinsically dynamic and complexly structured, consisting in human 
agency, structures and contexts of action, none of which are given or fixed, 
and where each presupposes each other without being reducible to, identifiable 
with, or explicable completely in terms of, any other. (Lawson, 1997, p.159)  
 
Social reality is processual, interconnected, and organic. Society is structured, that is, 
social structures are real. Furthermore, social structures are emergent; they cannot be 
explained by their perception by the individual human beings on which their reality 
depends (Lawson, 2006, pp.495-496). The social ontology defended by Lawson is one 
that affirms the absolute interconnectedness of structure and agency. This description 
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fits with the principles of a postmodern social ontology. Institutions constitute the 
social realm.  
The second part of Heterodox Economic Methodology is then to formulate 
methods that will respect this social ontology. By the nature of the social ontology 
described above – its general applicability to the social realm – the methods and 
consequent methodology derived will also be applicable to the entirety of the social 
realm. Lawson and Orléan share this position:  
 
[T]he materials and principles of social reality are the same across economics, 
sociology, politics, anthropology, human geography, and all other disciplines 
concerned with the study of social life. Hence I think we must accept that 
there is no legitimate basis for distinguishing a separate science of economics. 
Rather, economics is best viewed as at most a division of labour within a 
single social science. (Lawson, 2006, p.499)  
 
All the social sciences, I maintain, are subject to the same logic of explanation. 
One may expect considerable advances to be made with the adoption of what 
might be called a unidisciplinary perspective. (Orléan, 2013, p.195)  
 
However, they both argue that approaches of this sort exist already. For example, 
Lawson, through his focus on the orthodox/heterodox binary, assumes that the 
alternative economic approach, heterodox economics, in opposing orthodox 
economics, is consistent with this opposing alternative social ontology: 
 
My claim is that something like the alternative ontology described above […] 
systematises the implicit preconceptions of the various heterodox traditions, 
and ultimately explains their enduring opposition to the mainstream (Lawson, 
2006, p.497).  
 
This jump is made hastily and consequently heterodox economics escapes scrutiny by 
Lawson as to whether this is actually the case. I detail further in Chapter Four the 
methods proposed by Orléan and Lawson as appropriate to a general social scientific 
methodology and demonstrate that herein lies their theories’ weakness.  
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In summary, Lawson argues that theory is fundamentally ontological. It must be 
underpinned by a definition of ontology, one that is, in Lawson’s terms, “realist”. 
Theory must begin by defining ontology. Lawson’s theory can then proceed in two 
parts; it provides a normative framework for analysing theory and a project for 
heterodox economics: 
 
1. Normative Framework 
i. Step 1: Define approach to be critiqued by method 
ii. Step 2: Infer ontology and epistemology from method 
iii. Step 3: Judge theory by the proximity of ontology to reality 
2. Methodological Project 
i. Infer methods that respect a “realist” social ontology 
ii. The resulting methodology will be generally applicable to the social 
sciences 
 
1.4 Orléan and Heterodox Economic Methodology 
Orléan, in The Empire of Value, in large part mirrors the analytical steps taken by 
Lawson. Orléan essentially follows the normative framework outlined above. 
However, he begins his analysis by affirming what he believes to be the identifying 
method, not just of orthodox economics, but also of economics in general. The French 
economic heterodoxy retains that the starting point of economics is a 
conceptualisation of the notion of value (Aglietta, 1976; Durkheim, 1937; Marx, 
1967; Orléan, 2011). Value, in the English language literature, is a notion that is 
largely neglected.  
Orléan, through the observation of conceptualisations of value, the most 
fundamental category of economics, discovers a commonality. This commonality is 
that the two great traditions of theories of value, those based in utility and those based 
in labour, both search to define value by an objective pre-existing scale. They 
therefore conceive of value as a Substance/Essence. Economics is defined, separate 
from the other social sciences, by the ontological position that value is a 
Substance/Essence (Orléan, 2011, pp.22-23).  
Orléan completes by this the first two steps of Lawson’s normative 
framework. Economics is defined by the method that attributes the existence of value 
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to a scale pre-existing the exchange process. This method has the result that, 
ontologically, value is presupposed as a Substance/Essence, a universal entity that can 
be calculated without reference to social relations. Orléan then completes the third 
step; he critiques economics as he deems this ontology to be inconsistent with reality. 
 Orléan, however, misses the most important part. Orléan does not clearly 
outline his alternative conceptualisation of reality, other than to say that it is one in 
which economic value is not a Substance/Essence. He attributes the inspiration for his 
undefined social ontology to Marx’s theory of commodity fetishism and argues that 
Durkheim holds the same conception of reality. I analyse this attribution of inspiration 
in Chapters Three and Four.  
 This departure is important as Orléan nonetheless proceeds with the 
methodological project. Methods are proposed as appropriate to an economics 
consistent with reality. However, this reality is only defined by the affirmation of the 
non-existence of Substances/Essences. This is not an adequately strong basis for the 
development of a new methodology for economics let alone the social sciences in 
their entirety. The under-theorisation of social ontology leads to a methodological 
prescription that is flawed.  
Orléan and Lawson conduct their analyses in very similar manners. They both 
seek to define economics based on ontology and to critique it based on this ontology’s 
distance from reality. Their identification, however, of the element of economics that 
fundamentally divorces it from reality, differs. For Lawson, it is the ontological 
presupposition of the mathematical-deductivist method that human beings are isolated 
atoms. For Orléan, it is the ontological position that value is a Substance/Essence. 
 Both then also deem the second step of this analysis to be the development of 
a methodology that is respectful of reality. They differ, however, on the content they 
give to this second step. Lawson, after first defining his conception of social reality, 
sees a history of this respect in various heterodox traditions such as Marxism, post-
Keynesianism, and Institutionalism. Orléan, skipping the definition of his conception 
of social reality, sees the approach closest to reality to be that developed by 
Durkheim. 
 That being said, the similarities between Lawson and Orléan are far stronger 
than their differences. It is in this difference, however, that they provide the clues to 
reciprocally resolving the weaknesses in their respective theories and, furthermore, 
strengthening Heterodox Economic Methodology.  
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Chapter Two 
 
The Empire of Value 
 
2.1 Overview 
I will now summarise the analysis conducted by Orléan in The Empire of Value. In 
this chapter, I provide my own translations of any citations used6. This detailed 
outline focuses specifically on those passages that set up Orléan’s ontological 
framework and the methodological prescriptions that he consequently derives. 
However, I will first provide a brief overview of the entirety of the analysis.  
 Orléan starts by identifying that Substance/Essence is an unacceptable 
ontology of economic value because it is contrary to reality. A Substance/Essence 
ontology of value underpins almost all economics in the form of the utility and labour 
theories of value. However, the reality of value is that it is an Institution. Orléan 
argues that Marx manifested an understanding of this Institutional reality in the theory 
of commodity fetishism. I will go into all this in detail shortly. 
Although I will not analyse the following in this thesis, Orléan presents two 
examples of what he deems to be a more satisfactory picture of economic phenomena. 
These two examples are Thorstein Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption and 
the theory of money developed by Michel Aglietta and Orléan (1984, 1998, 2002).  
Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption is used to refute Léon Walras’ 
“theory of value” that grounds its determination of utility in the apparently objective 
criterion of scarcity. However, the theory of conspicuous consumption attributes the 
desire for commodities to “pecuniary emulation”. This implies that one’s position in 
the social hierarchy is demonstrated by one’s consumption and hence that in order to 
move up in this hierarchy, one must mimic the purchases of those in the social class 
directly above themselves (Veblen, 1998). The desire for commodities is linked to the 
desire for social advance. Orléan’s argument is, simply, that if this mimetic origin of 
                                                
6 I will use my own translations because I believe that the working English translation reproduced in 
Appendix 2 does not emphasise the more general philosophical principles implied in Orléan’s original. 
The emphasis, in translation, shifts from the establishment of a general framework for understanding 
economics to a more specific explanation of the various points that Orléan discusses. The bigger 
picture is lost. 
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the desire for commodities exists, the exclusive determination of utility by scarcity is 
refuted. 
This analysis of mimicry leads into Aglietta and Orléan’s theory of money. 
Mimicry as an economic motive, which Orléan names mimetic desire, is the 
fundamental assumption of Orléan and Aglietta’s theory of money. This theory of 
money dictates that “money is what founds a market economy”7. Exchange is first and 
foremost dependent upon the existence of money, the “master desire”8. Money, 
however, exists and is upheld because of mimetic desire. People want money because 
other people want money. Money exists because everybody wants it for the same 
reason. The basis of the capitalist market relation is this irrational mimetic desire.  
It is from this theory that Orléan finds his way to the question of value. If 
exchange exists not because there is something fundamentally in common between 
commodities but rather because money, the universal equivalent, makes the exchange 
of commodities possible, then there is no longer any logical reason to require a theory 
of value that attributes the existence of value to some pre-existing scale. Within the 
market, “price and value are one and the same”9. This, however, is not a sufficient 
explanation as to the nature of value. Value remains a notion whose existence must be 
understood in its own right. Therefore, Orléan turns to understanding the reality of the 
existence of value, that is, where value is an Institution. 
Orléan argues that the social sciences share a common understanding as to the 
socially constructed and socio-historically specific nature of Institutions. He 
elaborates the different explanations of different approaches that have already tried to 
understand this kind of entity. The approach on which Orléan most heavily relies is 
that developed by Durkheim. Orléan finishes The Empire of Value by analysing 
financial markets as a real example of the absolutely socially constructed nature of 
value and its complete lack of grounding in any pre-existing fundamental 
Substance/Essence. 
The focus of this thesis is the part of Orléan’s analysis at the level of 
abstraction of methodology. Those parts of The Empire of Value left to the brief 
outlined above – Veblen, the theory of money, and financial markets – are examples 
at a reduced level of abstraction and are therefore not the concern of this thesis. They 
                                                
7 « La monnaie fonde l’économie marchande » (Orléan, 2011, p.148) 
8 « désir maître » (Orléan, 2011, p.150) 
9 « Prix et valeur sont une seule et même réalité » (Orléan, 2011, p.169) 
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constitute the manner in which Orléan arrived at an analysis of value and not that 
analysis itself.  
 
2.2 Value is an Institution 
Orléan begins The Empire of Value by the assertion that “I refuse to accept that 
market value can be identified with a substance […] that pre-exists exchange”10. 
Specifically with regard to the market relation, Orléan outlines how he regards it as 
implausible that the values produced by this relation could be determined by some 
pre-existing scale. However, this is the method of economic theory, whether this scale 
is based on utility or labour. To Orléan, market, or economic, value seems self-
evidently to be the product of the market relation, in which a variety of factors are 
involved in the process of valuation. It is therefore unrealistic to attempt to determine 
the value of commodities prior to exchange and on the basis of only one of these 
contributing factors, whether it be utility, labour, or any other (Orléan, 2011, p.12). 
Although Orléan makes these observations specifically with regard to economics, he 
later generalises these observations to the entirety of the social realm. The two general 
principles that are found already in Orléan’s incredulity towards this method for 
measuring value, and that will structure Orléan’s entire argument, are that, on one 
hand, a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures is unrealistic (economic value 
cannot be determined by a substance) and, on the other, social reality is of an 
Institutional ontology (market value must be understood as the product of the market 
relation).  
 The originality of Orléan’s argument, within the wider heterodoxy of 
economic thought, is to argue that a fundamental commonality exists underpinning 
both orthodox and heterodox economic thought. This commonality is the theorisation 
of value as having the ontology of a Substance/Essence. This ontological position is 
the result of the method employed by economics theorists. Economists, in general, 
search for a scale by which the relative values of commodities may be determined 
prior to the messy negotiations of the market. Orléan establishes, on the basis of this 
novel observation, a new manner of categorising schools of thought, as heterodox and 
orthodox are no longer suitable. These categories are Quantitative Economics11, 
                                                
10 «  [N]ous refusons d'admettre que la valeur marchande puisse s'identifier à une substance […] qui 
préexiste aux échanges » (Orléan, 2011, p.12) 
11 « économie des grandeurs » (Orléan, 2011, pp.22-23)  
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defined as economic approaches that a founded on a Substance/Essence ontology of 
value, and Institutional Economics12, defined as economic approaches that understand 
value to be the product of social relations, that is, to have an Institutional ontology. 
Quantitative economics is accused of fundamentally reifying commodities as this 
approach attributes to them an inherent value, in the sense that value pre-exists the 
exchange process. Quantitative economics is the tradition that has taken hold of not 
only the orthodoxy but also much of the heterodoxy. Institutional economics is a 
tradition that Orléan hopes to begin building by publishing works like The Empire of 
Value (Orléan, 2011, pp.22-23). It is unclear specifically which existing approaches 
Orléan would classify as Institutional economics.  
Orléan illustrates the method of Quantitative economics by taking emblematic 
examples of the orthodoxy and the heterodoxy, Walras and Marx respectively. This 
common method is to search for an objective scale to measure the values of 
commodities. Whether this scale is grounded in a utility or a labour theory of value 
does not matter as “these approaches share the same fundamental conception by 
which, to theorise exchange, one must go further than apparent monetary transactions 
so as to reveal the presence of a hidden magnitude that logically pre-exists and 
organises transactions”13. This method presupposes a Substance/Essence ontology of 
value. If value can be calculated for all commodities without reference to the 
exchange process, market/economic value is no longer restricted to the capitalist 
market relation. Value is transhistorical and it exists universally. A social structure of 
this sort is a Substance/Essence. Economics therefore observes the world through 
ideological glasses in which a law of value determines the relationships of economic 
exchange (Orléan, 2011, p.24). 
Specifically, Walras grounds his utility theory of value in the objective 
criterion of scarcity. Walras seeks to demonstrate that the relative scarcities of two 
commodities will be equal, in equilibrium, to their relative values. Marx proceeds in 
the same fashion. Marx searches for the one thing that otherwise heterogeneous goods 
                                                
12 « économie des relations » (Orléan, 2011, pp.22-23). I have chosen to translate “économie des 
relations”, which could more literally be translated as “relational economics”, as Institutional 
economics because, while referring to the same thing, Institutional economics pays homage to an 
already existing tradition of economic thought and keeps consistency with the Institutional ontology 
that defines, in Orléan’s framework, this category.   
13 « ces approches partagent la même conception princeps selon laquelle, pour penser l’échange, il 
convient d’aller par-delà l’apparence des transactions monétaires de façon à mettre en évidence la 
présence d’une grandeur cachée qui préexiste logiquement aux transactions et les organise » (Orléan, 
2011, p.24).  
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have in common and concludes that this can only be that they are the products of 
labour. Marx must then render labour objective, which he does through the concept of 
socially necessary labour. As a result of this objective measure, relative quantities of 
socially necessary labour are presented as equal to the relative values of commodities 
(Orléan, 2011, pp.25-27). Marx and Walras employ the same method when 
conceptualising value and this results in the attribution, to value, of an unrealistic 
Substance/Essence ontology.  
The true nature of market economies, and of social reality more generally, is 
that social structures are Institutions. Value, as a social structure, is an Institution. In 
answer to the first question of this thesis, that which asks for an elaboration of the 
ontology which informs this reality, Orléan points the reader towards the theory of 
commodity fetishism, as outlined by Marx. This is the first point of contention that I 
have with Orléan’s analysis. In short, Orléan argues that, in the theory of commodity 
fetishism, Marx describes a reality consistent with an Institutional ontology, one in 
which value is socially constructed and socio-historically specific. Even if value may 
have an objective appearance, Marx argues one must always remember that value is 
the socio-historically specific product of equally specific social relations. Orléan 
observes therefore that Marx subsequently professes a belief in an Institutional 
ontology while structurally implying a Substance/Essence ontology. These two 
positions are contradictory. Orléan attributes the existence of contradictions within 
Marx’s body of work to this fundamental contradiction. Orléan uses this as evidence 
that a Substance/Essence ontology must be absolutely rejected if an Institutional 
ontology is to be respected within a theoretical setup. For coherence, one must 
respect, consistently, one ontology (Orléan, 2011, pp.41-47). Orléan’s project is 
therefore to rehabilitate Marx by making his theory generally respect an Institutional 
ontology. Orléan mistakenly argues that his Institutional project is Marxist because of 
its affinity with the theory of commodity fetishism. I argue this point in detail in 
Chapter 3. 
Orléan’s analysis of value then turns to inferring the implications of attributing 
to economic value an Institutional ontology. The major implication is that, “one of the 
strengths of this conception is that it is not limited to economics alone; it can be found 
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in numerous sociological analyses”14. In other words, the reality of an Institutional 
ontology is not only true with regard to economic phenomena but also to social reality 
in general. Furthermore, this fact has already been understood by other disciplines, 
most notably sociology, that are much further advanced in their understanding of this 
reality. Institutions, including economic value, share a common ontology (Orléan, 
2011, p.189). Moreover, the disciplines that study Institutions have a common 
epistemology: “an economic fact is a social fact like any other. It does not have its 
own essence that would justify a specific epistemology”15. Therefore, at the level of 
abstraction of methodology, the set of principles to be developed to understand the 
Institutional dynamic in question are not principles specific to economics but to all 
those disciplines whose objects of analysis find themselves in the social realm. These 
disciplines are the social sciences. The first implication of the belief in the reality of 
an Institutional ontology is the possibility and desirability of what Orléan calls a 
“unidisciplinary” perspective (Orléan, 2011, pp.186-187). This is the project to build 
a general social scientific methodology.  
Orléan reasons that if other approaches have already attempted to study 
Institutions then, as a starting point for this social scientific methodology, one should 
look to those examples. This is done in the hope of reducing the enormity of what is 
being proposed. To be clear, what is proposed is that, hitherto, economics has been 
underpinned by an unrealistic ontology and therefore must be revolutionised from the 
bottom up while concurrently generalising this new methodology to the social 
sciences as a whole. Orléan therefore argues that this methodology is not new at all, 
that the sociological tradition has approached the understanding of the social realm in 
this manner for over a hundred years. The “unidisciplinary” project seems much more 
manageable if it is reformulated as simply the extension of an already developed 
methodology, that of sociology, to a discipline to which it is also applicable, 
economics (Orléan, 2011, pp.188-199).  
This is where Orléan provides an answer to the second question of this thesis; 
that of the methodological principles implied by an Institutional ontology. Orléan’s 
answer is that these methodological principles are already embodied in the work of 
Durkheim. Justification for this is found in an examination of Durkheim’s conception 
                                                
14« Une des forces de cette conception est qu'elle n'est pas limitée à la seule économie ; on la retrouve 
dans de nombreuses analyses sociologiques » (Orléan, 2011, p.186)  
15 « le fait économique est un fait social comme un autre. Il ne possède en rien une essence particulière 
qui justifierait une épistémologie spécifique » (Orléan, 2011, p.186) 
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of an Institutional ontology, which is found to be strikingly similar to that which 
informs Orléan and, more generally, this thesis. Durkheim recognises the socially 
constructed and socio-historically specific nature of Institutions. Furthermore, he 
describes, for the most part, the dialectical dynamic of their existence, even if far 
greater weight is given to the conditioning power of Institutions. Orléan then presents 
an example of Durkheim’s method, outlining his analysis of the totemic religious 
practices of indigenous Australians (Durkheim, 1960). Durkheim, as it can also be 
argued of Marx, observed the reality of an Institutional ontology (Orléan, 2011, 
pp.199-213). What we are interested in here however is not this observation but 
whether this reality can be respected methodologically. This is my second point of 
contention with Orléan’s analysis, and is an example of where, as I argue in Chapter 
Four, Heterodox Economic Methodology more generally trips up. Orléan makes the 
assumption that the a priori belief in an Institutional ontology will necessarily mean 
the a posteriori methodological respect of such an ontology. I demonstrate in Chapter 
Four that this is not the case. 
The major contribution that comes out of Orléan’s analysis in The Empire of 
Value is the observation that a common unrealistic ontology underpins economics 
across the boundaries of the orthodoxy and heterodoxy. This observation, when its 
implications are consistently inferred, as is the aim of this thesis, has important 
consequences for Heterodox Economic Methodology. The existence of unrealistic 
ontologies is more pervasive and subversive than observed by Lawson. Pluralist 
methods also have the potential for presupposing unrealistic ontologies. I argue, 
however, that Orléan does not consistently infer the implications of his observation 
that a Substance/Essence ontology of value is fundamental to economics.  
The reason for this is Orléan’s attribution of the philosophical grounding of 
this position to Marx. This inadequate philosophical grounding means that inadequate 
scrutiny goes into judging appropriate methodological principles for such a “realist” 
analysis. It is for this reason that Durkheim is suggested. Orléan makes the same 
mistake as Lawson in deeming that an existing theory already follows methodological 
principles that can be generalised to the entirety of the social sciences. The 
methodological implications of an Institutional ontology can only be correctly 
inferred when Orléan’s rejection of Substance/Essence is grounded in a philosophy 
that begins in this same manner, by rejecting Substance/Essence.   
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Chapter Three 
 
Postmodern Social Ontology 
 
3.1 Postmodern reality 
In reality, value is an Institution. Orléan, however, does not elaborate clearly the 
philosophy of this reality. As I have established, defining reality is essential to a 
realist approach. In the case of social science, reality is social reality, the philosophy 
of which is social ontology. Therefore, it is essential to outline the social ontology 
implied as real by The Empire of Value, consistent with, on one hand, the rejection of 
a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures and, on the other, his affirmation 
that the reality of social structures is that they are Institutions.  
Although Orléan does not clearly elaborate his conception of social ontology, 
he does attribute inspiration to Marx. I must therefore first extract this ontological 
understanding from a Marxist frame.  
Orléan also attributes the continuing development of Institutional ontology to 
Durkheim. Durkheim’s conceptualisation of Institutions, despite its acknowledgement 
of the socially constructed nature of these Institutions, disregards almost entirely the 
ontology of human beings and focuses, rather, on the conditioning power of 
Institutions. I must also refute this grounding.  
The social ontology implied by Orléan’s rejection of Substance/Essence is 
outlined consistently by Sartre. I have chosen Sartre as he shares with Orléan, as a 
starting point, the rejection of Substance/Essence in the form of the belief that 
“existence precedes essence” (Sartre, 1970). Sartre (1960, 1968) then develops a 
social ontology that I will demonstrate is very similar to that of Lawson. 
What differentiates Sartre’s social ontology, and Orléan’s work, from 
Lawson’s is the emphasis on Substance/Essence. Though Lawson does not emphasise 
this point, I argue that it is evidenced by the proximity of his ontology to Sartre’s that 
he also implicitly rejects Substance/Essence. This emphasis reveals that the opposing 
Institutional and Substance/Essence ontologies belong, respectively, to different 
philosophical paradigms: postmodernism and modernism. Reality is not universal. 
Reality is specific to philosophical paradigms. “Realism”, as advocated by Lawson 
and Orléan, is postmodernism.   
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3.2 Marx and Ontology 
Orléan (2011a) states that the overarching aim of his research is to develop a model of 
the market relation that is equal to the model Marx developed of the wage relation. 
Orléan believes that Marx’s theory of the market relation is fundamentally flawed by 
the conceptualisation of economic value as having a Substance/Essence ontology. 
This ontology of social structures, implied by Marx’s formulation of the market 
relation, is contradictory to the ontology in which, Orléan claims, Marx otherwise 
believes. Marx, on one hand, is claimed to correctly describe an ontology that 
understands the socio-historically specific and socially constructed nature of 
Institutions. On the other, he conceptualises value as a Substance/Essence. These two 
ontologies are incompatible and contradictory (Orléan, 2011, pp.41-47). Orléan cites 
Cornelius Castoriadis to argue that this fundamental contradiction is the source of 
confusion and ambiguity in Marx’s work:  
 
The paradox, the antinomy of Marx’s thought, lies in the fact that Labour, 
which constantly modifies everything, including itself, is at the same time 
conceived of under the category of Substance/Essence, of that which can 
“appear” under a given form or take on a given “expression” […] but which, 
in itself, does not modify itself, does not alter, and subsists as the immutable 
foundation of changing attributes and determinations. (Castoriadis, 1984, 
p.274)  
 
Castoriadis clearly outlines the manner in which it is contradictory to concurrently 
profess that something is constantly modified and at the same time universal and 
unchanging. This contradiction pervades Marx’s thought. Orléan conceives therefore 
of his project as resolving this contradiction in favour of the realistic Institutional 
ontology. 
However, Orléan’s overarching aim implies that he believes Marx’s model of 
the wage relation to be free of a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures. This 
is not the case. Exploitation makes sense only when a conceptualisation of value as a 
Substance/Essence is accepted. Exploitation is a technical term that signifies the 
difference in value between the wage paid and the labour power exerted. This 
difference can only be calculated when the value of labour power can be objectively 
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pre-established, as only a Substance/Essence can (Lordon, 2010, p.148). The labour 
theory of value is the fundamental structuring force behind the wage relation, the 
market relation, and, hence, Marxist theory in general. Despite this fundamental 
fallacy, Orléan conceives of his own understanding of reality as also originating from 
Marx.  
I agree fully with the analysis that deems that the labour theory of value 
conceives of value as a Substance/Essence and that this is unrealistic. However, even 
if I am to accept that the opposed Institutional ontology, which Orléan believes is real, 
has its origins in the particularly ambiguous theory of commodity fetishism, in 
Capital, the theory of commodity fetishism, though of particular interest, is, as even 
Orléan will attest, insignificant beside the labour theory of value: 
 
Marx’s critique of fetishism cannot be seen as an integral part of the 
quantitative determination of labour value. It appears instead as an adjunct to 
the main argument on this point, in the fourth chapter of Das Kapital, where it 
is introduced as a sort of precautionary measure (Orléan, 2013, p.45).  
 
It is therefore implausible to place the contradictory ontologies of Substance/Essence 
and Institutions on equal footing and even more so to suggest that to rehabilitate Marx 
one needs only to extend consistently the principles of the theory of commodity 
fetishism to the entirety of his theoretical corpus. This is akin to saying that to repair a 
crack in the wall of a house, one need simply demolish the house. Orléan (2011, p.54) 
characterises his project, with regard to Marx, as establishing a new theoretical 
foundation. It is important to understand that it is, in fact, a demolition. Though Marx 
may have insightfully observed something of the socially-historically specific and 
socially constructed nature of Institutions, it is not on this ontology that his theory is 
built. The ontology presupposed by Marx’s method is Substance/Essence. At best, 
Marx observed something of the Institutional nature of society but left this 
observation theoretically undeveloped. Marx’s theory is modernist by its 
conceptualisation of value as a Substance/Essence. Its reality is not that of Orléan. 
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3.3 Postmodern Social Ontology 
The social ontology that I deem to be consistent with Orléan’s position that a 
Substance/Essence ontology of social structures is unrealistic is that of Sartre. First, 
however, I must begin by refuting Orléan’s other professed and more developed 
source of his conception of social structures, Durkheim. I will then turn to the 
existentialist ontology developed by Sartre, which provides a far more satisfactory 
ontological foundation for Orléan’s theory. Sartre’s emphasis on Substance/Essence 
reveals that this “realist” social ontology is postmodern. I will argue that the 
implication of postmodernism is that an understanding of this reality requires what 
Castoriadis calls “a new logic”16. This means a paradigm shift. I will demonstrate that 
the social ontology deemed real by the Heterodox Economic Methodology is 
postmodern, which implies a radical split for a new heterodox economics from the 
modernist paradigm of the past. 
 
3.3.1 Durkheim and Institutions 
Orléan relies heavily on the analysis of Institutions developed by Durkheim. 
Durkheim considers society – a group of associated individuals – to be naturally 
productive of structures of a qualitatively different nature to the nature of the sum of 
the individuals that constitute said society. Otherwise stated, the coming together of 
individuals in society is deemed to naturally produce a collective consciousness that 
manifests itself as, for example, morals (Durkheim, 1924, pp.53-56). Generally, 
society is said to collectively produce, and then be structured by, entities that are 
irreducible to the human beings that have created them. These entities are Institutions 
(Durkheim, 1937, p.XXII). 
 Institutions are defined by the coercive power that they have over human 
beings, which I refer to as conditioning power (Durkheim, 1937, p.5). Durkheim 
describes the experienced reality of Institutions as being one in which they appear to 
human beings as pre-existing and impervious to change. Thus the coercive power of 
Institutions is great. They reign supreme over the members of society. Durkheim does 
recognise that human beings play a role in the construction of these Institutions 
(Durkheim, 1937, p.XXII). However, he pays no regard as to whether this fact would 
have any influence on the nature of these Institutions.  
                                                
16 My translation: « une nouvelle logique » (Castoriadis, 1978, p.210). 
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Sociology and, as implied by Orléan, all social science “can then de defined as 
the science of institutions, of their genesis and of their functioning” (Durkheim, 1938, 
p.lvi). In actuality, Durkheim pays little attention to the genesis of these Institutions 
except to say that they are naturally occurring in society. Durkheim’s focus is on the 
manner in which Institutions condition the members of society. Although he 
understands that the social world is not completely determined by these Institutions 
and that, furthermore, they are specific to different socio-historical contexts, in 
analysis, Durkheim prescribes that one should ignore these difficulties. 
 Durkheim’s method, while discussed in detail in Chapter 4, requires a brief 
explanation. This method demonstrates that Durkheim is unsuitable as an ontological 
foundation of Orléan. Durkheim’s main methodological prescription is that one must 
consider Institutions as things. This prescribes that, in attempting to understand a 
specific set of Institutions, one must consider them in isolation from their perception 
by individual human beings (Durkheim, 1937, p.45). As methods necessarily imply a 
social ontology, this method of isolation, regardless of Durkheim’s ostensible 
awareness of the socially constructed nature of Institutions, implies an ontology of 
isolation that is contrary to the reality of Institutions.  
 Durkheim does not take into account that the existence of Institutions is 
dependent on their continual reproduction by human beings. This dynamic is inherent 
to the reality of Institutions and must be taken into account if they are to be 
understood realistically. Durkheim’s method of isolation runs the risk of implying 
precisely the essentialism that Orléan rejects. Though Durkheim’s identification that 
society is made up of conditioning Institutions is an important intellectual landmark, it 
is a social ontology that must underpin Orléan’s theory. Durkheim is insufficient as he 
does not develop an ontology of human beings. 
 
3.3.2 Sartre and Human Beings 
Sartre’s ontology is first and foremost an ontology of human beings. The fundamental 
precept of Sartre’s existentialist ontology is the belief that the reality of human beings 
is one in which “existence precedes essence”. This is Orléan’s reality, one in which 
Substances/Essences, as I have defined them, cannot exist. The opposing position to 
that which Sartre upholds is the belief that “essence precedes existence”. Sartre 
accuses philosophers such as Diderot, Voltaire and Kant, because of their belief in a 
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human nature, and any theist philosophy, because of its belief in a god, of this 
position (Sartre, 1970, pp.20-21).  
Essence, as employed by Sartre, has a double meaning. When Sartre talks of 
philosophies in which “essence precedes existence”, the term essence is synonymous 
to Substance/Essence. When, however, Sartre states that “existence precedes 
essence”, this implies that essences are constructed. Hence, the term essence is here 
synonymous with Institution. For Sartre, as for Orléan, a Substance/Essence ontology 
has no place in an understanding of social reality. 
 “Existence precedes essence” implies that first human beings exist. Everything 
else comes next and is the product of that existence. Existence, for Sartre, is the 
condemnation of human beings to freedom. This is because existence is all human 
action. Human beings, as condemned free agents, have choice over these actions. 
However, as non-choice and non-action also remain choices and actions, human 
beings cannot choose not to act and are condemned to therefore perpetually produce 
and construct. This is what is meant by a condemnation to freedom. For Sartre, “life 
has no meaning, a priori”17. First, human beings exist and, though theoretically at that 
instant they are nothing, the production of values and meaning begins instantly by the 
uncontrollably productive nature of that existence. Society and those structures that 
constitute it begin to be constructed instantly.  
 
3.3.3 Sartre and Social Ontology 
The social ontology that Sartre (1960, 1968) develops results from an attempt to 
respect his own ontology of the freedom of human beings, while concurrently 
“[accepting] without reservation the thesis set forth by Engels in his letter to Marx: 
‘Men themselves make their history but in a given environment which conditions 
them’” (Sartre, 1968, p.85). In other words, Sartre attempts to take into account the 
reality that Institutions have a strong conditioning power, which limits a posteriori the 
freedom he attributes a priori to human beings. For an Institutional reality to be 
consistent with an existentialist ontology, the making of history, and more generally 
the interaction between human beings and Institutions, must be understood as praxis: 
 
                                                
17 My translation: « la vie n’a pas de sens, a priori » (Sartre, 1970, p.89)  
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If one wants to grant to Marxist thought its full complexity, one would have to 
say that man […] is at once both the product of his own product and a 
historical agent who can under no circumstances be taken as a product. This 
contradiction is not fixed; it must be grasped in the very movement of praxis. 
Then it will clarify Engel’s statement: men make their history on the basis of 
real, prior conditions […], but it is the men who make it and not the prior 
conditions. Otherwise men would be merely the vehicles of inhuman forces 
which through them would govern the social world. To be sure, these 
conditions exist, […] but the movement of human praxis goes beyond them 
while conserving them. Certainly men do not grasp the real measure of what 
they do […]. But if History escapes me, this is not because I do not make it; it 
is because the other is making it as well. (Sartre, 1968, pp.87-88)  
 
Sartre accepts that human beings make their history on the basis of prior real 
conditions. However, he argues that, in the last instance, human beings make this 
history and not the prior conditions. Although these prior conditions, or Institutions, 
have a power of conditioning, reality is human praxis. The concurrent reality of 
Institutions is wholly dependent on human action; the reality of Institutions is 
“parasitic” (Sartre, 1960, p.55). The complex reality of society is that human beings, 
through their conscious and unconscious actions, reproduce existing Institutions while 
simultaneously constructing new Institutions. And all the while, Institutions, both 
those pre-existing and those constructed by each action, condition human beings. 
Institutions, however, are nothing but their manifestations through the actions of 
human beings. 
Lawson also argues that the reality of the interaction between human beings 
and social structures is praxis: 
 
[I]f we can agree with Marx that human beings “make their own history, but 
not in the circumstances of their own choosing”, we must emphasise […] that 
the circumstances and history in question are not fully understood intentional 
products […]. Society and economy are perpetually reproduced and/or 
transformed through praxis. (Lawson, 1997, p.173)  
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The social ontology that Sartre and Lawson both claim as real is one that is realised 
by dialectical praxis. This is because two social realities, Institutions and human 
beings, which are interconnected although different, must be accepted concurrently. 
First, reality is that in the social realm nothing other than human beings exists a 
priori. Secondly, however, the reality of human existence is also that human beings 
are conditioned by Institutions of their own making, which, in turn, remain dependent 
on human beings for reproduction. Praxis, a dialectic of concurrently conditioned and 
constructing human agency, is the reality of human existence. This reality is one that 
concurrently reaffirms the agency of human beings and the conditioning to which they 
are subject. This reality exists, however, according to Sartre, only through the praxis 
of the human act. 
Sartre seeks to reaffirm the supremacy of human action. For this reason, he 
names his social ontology the project: 
 
We affirm the specificity of the human act, which cuts across the social milieu 
while still holding on to its determinations and which transforms the world on 
the basis of given conditions. For us man is characterised above all by his 
going beyond a situation, and by what he succeeds in making of what he has 
been made – even if he never recognises himself in his objectification. […] 
The most rudimentary behaviour must be determined both in relation to the 
real and present factors which condition it and in relation to a certain object, 
still to come, which it is trying to bring into being. This is what we call the 
project. (Sartre, 1968, p.91)  
 
Sartre expresses here that the part of human reality that he deems most human is the 
construction of new Institutions, “his going beyond a situation”. Though praxis is the 
concurrent conditioned reproduction and creation of new Institutions, Sartre privileges 
the creation of new Institutions as it is this that demonstrates that human beings are 
still, if only relatively, free.  
That being said, the reality of the project remains praxis. Sartre describes the 
dialectical dynamic of praxis as: 
 
[A] passage from the objective to objective through internalisation. The 
project, as the subjective surpassing of objectivity toward objectivity, and 
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stretched between the objective conditions of the environment and the 
objective structures of the field of possibles, represents in itself the moving 
unity of subjectivity and objectivity, those cardinal determinants of activity. 
The subjective appears then as a necessary moment in the objective process. If 
the material conditions which govern human relations are to become real 
conditions of praxis, they must be lived in the particularity of particular 
situations. […] But all this objectivity refers ultimately to a lived reality. […] 
In the lived experience, the subjectivity turns back upon itself and wrenches 
itself from despair by means of objectification. Thus the subjective contains 
within itself the objective which it denies and which it surpasses toward a new 
objectivity; and this new objectivity by virtue of objectification externalises 
the internality of the project as an objectified subjectivity. This means both 
that the lived as such finds its place in the result and that the projected 
meaning of the action appears in the reality of the world (Sartre, 1968, pp.97-
98) 
 
What this means is that existence – human action – is influenced by objective social 
structures. However, simultaneously, social structures have no reality other than their 
manifestation through human action. In other words, human beings are conditioned 
because they internalise social structures that influence their subjective action. 
Actions, then, at once reproduce and surpass this original objective influence, that is, 
conditioning Institutional structures. Actions “make real”, and construct new, 
objective influences, that is, Institutional structures. The dynamic of this reality is 
therefore the dialectical praxis of constant interplay and interconnection between 
human beings and Institutions.  
This is, once again, very similar to the picture drawn by Lawson of the role of 
human beings and their actions in the social realm:  
 
Human beings are the moving forces in history and it is upon human actions 
or doings that everything in the social world turns. Not only is social structure 
reproduced and transformed through human practice but so too is the 
personality of each individual. Social structure is the, typically 
unacknowledged, condition of action as well as its, usually unintended, 
consequence. (Lawson, 1997, p.188)   
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Sartre and Lawson similarly conceptualise social ontology. I believe that this implies 
that Lawson also holds that a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures is 
unrealistic. However, the lack of emphasis on this element of his social ontology, 
combined with an insistence as to the “realism” of his approach, leads Lawson to 
ignore the importance, to his own understanding of reality, of his philosophical 
context. Sartre, by emphasising Substance/Essence, situates the belief in this reality in 
opposition to an alternative conception of reality: the philosophy by which essence is 
deemed to precede existence. A conception of reality is defined by one’s 
philosophical paradigm. Reality, as defined by Orléan, Sartre and Lawson, is specific 
to the current philosophical paradigm: postmodernism. Hitherto, precisely the 
ontology of social structures requiring rejection, the ontology of Substance/Essence, 
was considered to be reality. Modernism, the previously prevailing philosophical 
paradigm posited the Substance/Essence ontology of social structures as reality and 
structurally required it in the construction of social theory.  
 
3.3.4 Substance/Essence as Reality 
The principle that “existence precedes essence” opposes the principle that “essence 
precedes existence” (Sartre, 1970, pp.17-20). Using Sartre’s terms, modernism, in my 
definition, is a belief in, or a methodology that implies, a social ontology by which 
“essence precedes existence”. In this paradigm social structures are theorised as 
having a Substance/Essence ontology. Castoriadis (1978) argues that a 
Substance/Essence ontology is fundamental to modernism. He argues that this renders 
modernist thinkers incapable of realistically conceptualising Institutions. Therefore, a 
“break” from this paradigm is necessary if one is to understand Institutions as they 
really are (Castoriadis, 1976, pp.314-315).  
As cited above, Orléan relies on Castoriadis to make the argument that Marx’s 
fundamental problem is Substance/Essence. Orléan, however, does not take 
Castoriadis’ argument to its conclusion. Castoriadis goes on to explain how, within 
Marx’s “ontological framework”, which I am referring to as modernism, he could not 
have arrived at any other position:  
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Marx knows very well, and is the first to say, that the apparent 
homogenisation of products and labour emerges only with capitalism. It is 
capitalism which brings it into being. But how can Marx, within the 
ontological framework which is still his own, think that capitalism might be 
capable of bringing into being something which was not already there, at least 
potentially? So capitalism can only cause to appear; it “reveals” humanity to 
itself, […] the truth of its true being – that it is economic, that the truth of its 
life has always been production, the crystallisation into use-values of the 
Substance/Essence, Labour (Castoriadis, 1984, pp.276-277). 
 
Marx could not accept his own observation of the socially constructed nature of 
commodity form. His ontological framework forced him to search for the origin of the 
homogenisation of heterogeneous labour, that is, the commodity form, in a pre-
existing Substance/Essence. The Substance/Essence ontology of social structures is, 
according to Castoriadis, essential to Marx’s ontological framework, modernism. And 
the modernist framework is far-reaching. Hence, Durkheim is also criticised. The 
concept of “collective consciousness” is accused of being nothing more than a 
“hollow phrase” (Castoriadis, 1976, p.196). Furthermore, mathematical formalism is 
identified as incapable of conceptualising the socio-historical (Castoriadis, 1976, 
p.209). This is because, while employing the categories of “inherited thought”, it is 
impossible to go any further towards realistically conceptualising Institutions 
(Castoriadis, 1984, p.328). Modernism cannot understand Institutions.  
As Institutions are what make up society, modernist thought consequently 
cannot understand social reality: 
 
The true “historical bound” […] which constrains […] Marx, is the question of 
institution. What “limits” [him] […] is the impossibility, for inherited thought, 
of taking the social-historical into account as a mode of being which cannot be 
reduced to what is “known” from elsewhere. […] To think of the institution as 
it is, as a social-historical creation, requires one to break up the inherited 
logical-ontological framework; to propose another institution of society […] 
which […] cannot be “founded” in any kind of Nature or Reason (Castoriadis, 
1984, pp.328-329). 
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The method of “inherited thought”, when conceptualising social structures, is to 
search for a measure or understanding outside of the social relations in which the 
social structure appears. Social structures must be understood by being reduced to 
“what is ‘known’ from elsewhere”. This is the method of Quantitative economics, as 
defined by Orléan, and results in a conceptualisation of social structures as 
Substances/Essences.  
Castoriadis argues that we need to break with the inherited logical-ontological 
framework, that is, modernism, and develop “a new logic” capable of understanding 
the socio-historically constructed nature of Institutions. Castoriadis is advocating a 
paradigm shift. When he states that Institutions “cannot be ‘founded’ in any kind of 
Nature or Reason”, Castoriadis is referring, by “Nature or Reason” to the ontology of 
Substance/Essence. The founding of understanding in a Substance/Essence is required 
by the modernist paradigm. This is incompatible with an understanding of the newly 
observed reality of Institutions and therefore a new frame of reasoning, a new 
paradigm, is required.   
What the focus on Substance/Essence contributes, most importantly, to 
Heterodox Economic Methodology, is that it reveals its ontological opposition to the 
previous philosophical paradigm: modernism. This opposition implies that a 
methodology consistent with such an ontological opposition must also be in 
opposition to the previous paradigm. The ontology and methodology of Heterodox 
Economic Methodology must be postmodern. The number of economic approaches 
employing unrealistic ontologies extends, by this reasoning, much further than simply 
the orthodoxy. A far more radical break from previous theorisation is required than 
either Lawson or Orléan advocate.  
 
3.4 A Paradigm Shift 
Orléan, by grounding his critique of economics in the rejection of Substance/Essence, 
has led me to situate his social ontology, and consequently Lawson’s, as opposing the 
paradigm in which Substance/Essence is the reality of social structures: modernism. 
The normative requirement for economics, imposed by Lawson, is that economics 
must be “realist”, with “realism” defined as the methodological respect of social 
reality. Social reality, however, is not universal but specific to a philosophical 
paradigm. Orléan and Lawson’s social reality is only “real” within the current 
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paradigm: postmodernism. “Realism”, in Heterodox Economic Methodology, is 
postmodernism. 
This means that the ontologies deemed by Heterodox Economic Methodology 
to be unrealistic are, if my definition of modernism is accepted, presupposed by most 
thought up until the middle of the twentieth century. The kind of reality that Lawson 
and Sartre describe, even though it may seem self-evident to contemporary 
individuals, is in fact a very contemporary position to hold. Furthermore, it is entirely 
novel to seek to formulate a methodology that would structurally presuppose said 
reality. If it is true that a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures was the 
“realism” of the modernist paradigm, then this reality is pervasive in a quite general 
way. What I mean is that structurally, theories developed under this paradigm, that is 
most theory, will presuppose a Substance/Essence ontology of social structures. In 
Castoriadis’ words, “a new logic” is necessary if one hopes to realistically understand 
the postmodern reality of social structures. A paradigm shift, leaving behind all those 
theories built under the previous paradigm, is, in theory, necessary. An entirely new 
methodology, with most probably a new language, would be required to analyse 
social structures as Institutions while guaranteeing that this reality is respected.  
 Orléan and Lawson’s position that a “realist” social ontology – a postmodern 
social ontology – must be respected and furthermore is the starting point for a 
potential general social scientific methodology, implies a revolutionary break from 
previous theorisation, which neither thinker recognises. It would require a “fresh 
start” that is seemingly quite impossible. An analysis of the methods proposed as 
appropriate to a general social scientific methodology indicates the current 
impossibility of building a general social scientific methodology that could guarantee 
a respect of postmodern social ontology.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Social Scientific Methodology 
 
4.1 Social Ontology and Methodology 
This chapter will outline the implications for the methodological project of Heterodox 
Economic Methodology of the revelation that, through the analysis of Orléan’s claim 
that value is an Institution, the ontology that a general social scientific methodology is 
required to presuppose is specific to the postmodern paradigm. I will do this by 
examining the indications that may be drawn from the works of Orléan and Lawson 
with regard to the methods appropriate to a “realist” general social scientific 
methodology. 
In the case of Orléan, I will look at two different methodological outlines. 
First, I will critique Orléan’s suggestion of Durkheim (1938) as a model 
methodology. Then, I will argue that in addition to providing a more satisfactory 
ontology for Orléan, Sartre (1960) elaborates methodological principles with an actual 
respect for such an ontology. I will then compare these differing methodologies to the 
methodology outlined by Lawson (1997, 2003), highlighting once again its proximity 
with Sartre.  
These thinkers – Orléan, Sartre, Durkheim, and Lawson – all share largely the 
same beliefs as to the reality of social ontology. Furthermore, they feel that this social 
ontology, as it deems the reality of Institutions to be irreducible to simply the 
consciousnesses of the individuals from whence they came, justifies an independent 
area of study, social science18. Their grounding, and hence their projects, are the 
same: the elaboration of a methodology for the understanding of an Institutionally 
constituted social realm. I analyse each methodology by dividing it into its 
constitutive parts, ontology, epistemology and method.  
In Chapter Three of this thesis I posited that the sense in which this social 
ontology is “realist” is that it is in accordance with the current postmodern 
philosophical paradigm. I will now outline that the point at which we are currently is 
one where it is largely agreed that the epistemology and methodology of the social 
                                                
18 Durkheim and Sartre, when they employ, respectively, the terms sociology and anthropology, are 
referring to social science in the sense employed above.  
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sciences should be pluralist. This pluralism has a tendency to dissolve into a free-for-
all. This is a consequence of a failure to recognise that this project belongs to the 
movement of a paradigm shift. However such recognition may well imply that the 
methodological project is quite impossible; that the revolution in thought required is 
implausible.  
That being said, the normative framework of Heterodox Economic 
Methodology imposes a strict criterion for a theory to be “realist”: it must a posteriori 
imply a postmodern social ontology. However, heterodox economics seems to largely 
escape this a posteriori examination. For the moment, there is a tendency to equate 
pluralism with a respect of a postmodern social ontology. As the examples of Marx 
and Durkheim attest, this is not the case. One may employ a pluralist methodology 
and still arrive at the implication of an ontology contrary to social reality. In fact, as 
established, this unrealistic ontology is presupposed by most thought.  
I will now examine each methodological proposal in detail. I will demonstrate 
that methodological pluralism is the only consistent methodological prescription to be 
made from a starting point of postmodern social ontology. However, pluralism is 
insufficient to guarantee the respect of postmodern social ontology.  
 
4.2 Orléan’s Methodology 
Orléan’s prescription, in The Empire of Value, for a general methodology for social 
science is the method of Durkheim. Durkheim’s work, however, like Marx’s, is 
situated historically within the modernist paradigm. In my analysis, his work must be 
incapable of respecting a postmodern social ontology as it is structurally bound, by its 
paradigm, to an opposing conception of reality.  
Durkheim demonstrates that the simple extension of methods outside of 
mathematics does not guarantee the a posteriori respect of social reality. As I have 
already briefly argued, this is exemplified by the prescription that Institutions must be 
treated as things, denying their dynamic nature. Durkheim’s obsession, as outlined in 
The Rules of Sociological Method, with “the scientific method” leads him to develop, 
a posteriori, a framework divorced from his a priori professed Institutional social 
ontology.  
I have argued that, in replacement of Durkheim, Sartre (1960, 1970) provides 
a truly consistent ontological basis for Orléan’s theory. Therefore, the methodological 
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implications Sartre deems to arise, in Search for a Method, from such an ontology, are 
demonstrably consistent with his pre-defined social ontology. Sartre respects 
Lawson’s prescription that epistemology and method must be inferred from a base of 
ontology. Consequently Sartre’s conclusions are once again very similar to those of 
Lawson. 
 
4.2.1 Durkheim: The Scientific Method 
Durkheim (1924, 1937) deems Institutions to be what constitute society, states them 
as the objects of study for sociology or social science, and, most importantly, clearly 
acknowledges that to his mind they are constructed by groups of human beings. 
Society is defined as the creation of Institutions that results instantly from the coming 
together of human beings in groups (Durkheim, 1924, p.53). A science of these 
Institutions is warranted, as their understanding cannot be accessed simply through 
their manifestations within individual human consciousnesses, in which case 
psychology would be a sufficient scientific discipline for their understanding 
(Lawson, 1997, 2003; Durkheim, 1937). Durkheim believes in the same ontology as 
Orléan, Sartre, and Lawson.  
Durkheim’s divergence from this common ontological position begins when 
he outlines the method that he believes is necessary for a scientific understanding of 
Institutions. In keeping with the dominant positivist epistemology of the time, science 
is exclusively conceived of as an objective, empirical and experimental practice with 
the aim of producing objective facts. Science is the scientific method. He therefore 
attempts to outline a method for understanding Institutions in this way, to establish 
the existence, causes, and the functions of social facts (Durkheim, 1924, 1937). 
First, ontology is actively disregarded. Philosophy has no place in science 
because it is not the product of the scientific method. Philosophy is not built on 
“facts”. A priori, no philosophical conception of social ontology should inform 
epistemology or method because, according to Durkheim, this is the method of 
science:  
 
Our principle […] implies no metaphysical conception, no speculation about 
the fundamental nature of beings. What it demands is that the sociologist put 
himself in the same state of mind as the physicist, chemist or physiologist 
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when he probes into a still unexplored region of the scientific domain. When 
he penetrates the social world, he must be aware that he is penetrating the 
unknown; he must feel himself in the presence of facts whose laws are as 
unsuspected as were those of life before the era of biology. (Durkheim, 1938, 
p.xlv)  
 
All facts, according to Durkheim, must be the product of the scientific method as 
otherwise they are not facts in the sense that they are not objectively determined by 
the somewhat dubiously objective aforementioned scientific method. Ontology is 
expressly forbidden as the starting point of a “scientific” methodology for 
understanding the social realm (Durkheim, 1938). This explicitly goes against the 
principles of Heterodox Economic Methodology. Durkheim’s method, by ignoring 
ontology, is already not “realist”. 
Durkheim’s starting point is epistemology. In doing so, Durkheim proceeds to 
commit what Lawson calls the “epistemic fallacy”, which results from ignoring 
ontology when developing a theoretical framework (Lawson, 1997, p.154). The 
epistemic fallacy, according to Lawson, is the blind generalisation of positivist 
epistemology to all areas of enquiry that the researcher would like to be considered 
scientific. It ignores that epistemology is intimately linked to ontology and that there 
are ontological implications of different epistemologies. The epistemic fallacy, then, 
can otherwise be stated as “the supposition that […] ontology can be reduced to 
epistemology” (Lawson 1997, p.62). It is fallacious to conflate ontology and 
epistemology by positing epistemology as the starting point of all theory. This would 
imply that all objects of study share a common ontology, which is not the case.  
 Durkheim argues that the objects of scientific study must be “things”. Hence, 
social facts, to be the object of science, must be treated in this way: 
 
We assert not that social facts are material things but that they are things by 
the same right as material things […]. What, precisely, is a “thing”? A thing 
differs from an idea in the same way as that which we know from without 
differs from that which we know from within. Things include all objects of 
knowledge that cannot be conceived by purely mental activity, those that 
require for their conception data from outside the mind, from observations and 
experiments, those which are built up from the most external and immediately 
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accessible characteristics to the less visible and more profound. To treat the 
facts of a certain order as things is […] to assume a certain mental attitude 
toward them on the principle that when approaching their study we are 
absolutely ignorant of their nature, and that their characteristic properties, like 
the unknown causes on which they depend, cannot be discovered by even the 
most careful introspection. (Durkheim, 1938, p.xliii)  
 
The idea of conceiving of an object of study as a “thing” is an epistemological 
position, a philosophy as to the manner in which they can be known. Durkheim 
differentiates between ideas, which are the product of purely mental activity, and facts 
or “things”, which can be known through the scientific method. The former 
constitutes a vulgar knowledge whereas the latter is the factual basis upon which 
theories may be developed (Durkheim, 1938, p.17). “Things” must be understood 
using the objective methods of the sciences: empirical observation and 
experimentation.  
The scientific method must be adapted to the study of social facts. Durkheim 
(1938, p.125) does recognise, for example, that the social realm is not amenable to the 
variety of experimental methods employed in the natural sciences.  An early example 
of the correct method is interestingly outlined in opposition to the manner in which 
economics conceives of value:    
 
The subject matter of economics […] comprises not the realities given to 
immediate observation but merely conjectures that are the product of pure 
intellect. […] The most fundamental of all economic theories, that of value, is 
manifestly constructed according to this same method. If value had been 
studied as any fact of reality ought to be studied, the economist would 
indicate, first of all, by what characteristics one might recognise the thing so 
designated, then classify its varieties, investigate by methodical inductions 
what the causes of its variations are, and finally compare these various results 
in order to abstract a general formula. Theory would be introduced only when 
science had reached a sufficient stage of advancement. On the contrary, it is 
introduced at the very outset. In order to construct economic theory, the 
economist is content to mediate and to focus his attention on his own idea of 
value, that is, as an object capable of being exchanged; he finds therein the 
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idea of utility, scarcity, etc., and with these products of his analysis he 
constructs his definition. (Durkheim, 1938, pp.24-25) 
 
Durkheim’s criticism of the conceptualisation of economic value is almost exactly the 
same as that outlined in this thesis. However, Durkheim concludes that the fallacious 
nature of the philosophical grounding of economic theory means that all philosophical 
grounding should be jettisoned, not that such grounding must be reformulated to 
reflect social reality. Philosophy, “merely conjectures that are the product of pure 
intellect”, must be replaced by facts produced by the objective scientific method. 
Unfortunately, Durkheim is unable to recognise that the objectivity of the methods 
that he is proposing is not what it seems. The scientific method, which he proposes as 
the alternative, is laden with the same essentialist ideology, and belongs to the same 
philosophical paradigm, as the philosophy that posits a Substance/Essence ontology 
of value. Durkheim’s rejection of philosophy, grounded in the epistemic fallacy, 
misleads him to arrive at a method that will presuppose an ontology in opposition to 
his a priori outlined conception of social reality. 
 To specify, the method that Durkheim outlines for the observation of social 
facts is the following: 
 
1. All preconceptions must be eradicated. […] 
2. The subject matter of every sociological study should comprise a group of 
phenomena defined in advance by certain common external characteristics, 
and all phenomena so defined should be included within this group. […] 
3. When, then, the sociologist undertakes the investigation of some order of 
social facts, he must endeavour to consider them from an aspect that is 
independent of their individual manifestations. (Durkheim 1938, pp.31-45) 
 
Number (1) is the methodological application of the principle that ontology must be 
ignored. However, the eradication of all preconceptions from the human mind is an 
impossible endeavour. It is precisely an awareness of these preconceptions that is 
important to any kind of possibly objective analysis of the ideology-laden social 
realm.  
An example of number (2), the kind of common external characteristic by 
which a certain social fact can be defined, is, “we call every punished act a crime” 
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(Durkheim, 1938, p.36). Punishment is the external characteristic used to define those 
social facts categorised as crimes. Durkheim argues that despite the very simplistic 
nature of this definition, it is simply a technique to delimit the frame of analysis. He 
does not use this definition to explain the social fact in question. However, Durkheim 
concurrently argues that if crimes in society are punished, then there must be an 
“intimate bond” between this social fact and the manner in which society responds to 
it (Durkheim, pp.42-43). Durkheim reifies socially constructed responses to socially 
constructed concepts. 
What Durkheim is arguing in (3) is that social facts must be understood from 
an empirical standpoint. He states that: 
 
[C]ollective habits find expression in definite forms: legal rules, moral 
regulations, popular proverbs, social conventions, etc. As these forms have a 
permanent existence and do not change with the diverse applications made of 
them, they constitute a fixed object, a constant standard within the observer’s 
reach, exclusive of subjective impressions and purely personal observations. 
(Durkheim 1938, p.45) 
 
Durkheim attributes objectivity to these structures on the basis of their more or less 
enduring nature. It is observably untrue that “moral regulations” and “social 
conventions” “have a permanent existence and do not change with the diverse 
applications made of them”. Durkheim, once again, reifies socially constructed 
Institutions that contain within them no more objective reality than the subjective 
manifestations of social facts within individual consciousnesses.  
 For Durkheim, once social facts have been observed and identified, the 
sociological method should proceed to classify them with regard to the specific socio-
historical contexts in which they appear. This is because Durkheim prescribes that 
social facts should be explained with regard to antecedent social facts. Things should 
explain things. Through this method of classification, social facts can be ordered 
chronologically. 
Finally, the aim of the sociological method is to establish laws. According to 
Durkheim, this can be done using a single experimental method, the only one 
applicable to sociology: the comparative method. If two social facts are observably 
causally linked, Durkheim argues, then a law exists governing this causal link. 
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Therefore, a law may be inferred by comparative experimentation of this causal link, 
that is, by careful examination of all of the empirical evidence that may be collected 
with regard to the causal link between the two social facts in question and 
experimenting as to the manner in which changes occur causally (Durkheim, 1938, 
p.125; pp.130-131).  
 The manner in which social facts are defined and then classified by Durkheim 
attributes to them an ontology contrary to postmodern social ontology. Institutions are 
not things; they are not fixed in a manner in which they may be classified. Institutions 
are not of the same ontology as the objects of study of the other sciences precisely 
because they are constructed by human beings and require them for constant 
reproduction. It is in the ontology of these human beings that the difference is 
emphasised. Human beings have choice and may choose to not reproduce these 
Institutions. The ontology of Institutions is inextricably linked to the ontology of 
human beings. A “realist” methodology must reflect this. Durkheim’s methodology 
does not. It is doomed from the moment Durkheim chooses to ignore ontology. 
 
4.2.2 Sartre: The Regressive-Progressive Method 
According to Lawson (1997, 2003, 2006), a “realist” methodology must be based on, 
and continually respectful of, the ontology that one deems as real. The starting point 
for understanding is not a pre-existing method but the development of a method from 
the starting point of ontology. Sartre proceeds in this manner. From the starting point 
of his own ontology, outlined in Chapter Three, Sartre (1960, 1968) extrapolates the 
epistemological implications of such an ontology and then attempts to suggest a 
method respectful of such an epistemology. Sartre’s ontology has been outlined in 
Chapter Three. Sartre’s epistemology must now be considered. 
Sartre differentiates between “Knowledge”, which should be understood as 
referring to facts in the objective sense employed by Durkheim, and 
“comprehension”, which is the sort of knowledge that can be created with regard to 
the dynamic and transformative phenomena of the sort found in the social world. One 
cannot have “Knowledge” of the social realm, only comprehension. Sartre describes 
his epistemology as conceiving that:  
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[H]uman reality eludes direct knowledge to the degree that it makes it-self. 
The determinations of the person appear only in a society which constantly 
constructs itself […]. But these determinations are themselves sustained, 
internalised and lived […] by a personal project which has two fundamental 
characteristics: first, it cannot under any circumstances be defined by 
concepts; second, as a human project it is always comprehensible […]. To 
make this comprehension explicit […] reproduces the dialectic movement 
which starts from simple existing givens and is raised to signify activity. This 
comprehension, which is not distinguished from praxis, is at once both 
immediate existence […] and the foundation of an indirect knowing of 
existence […]. (Sartre, 1968, pp.170-171)  
 
The nature of knowledge, called comprehension, implied by Sartre’s social ontology 
is not different to any other facet of existence. Comprehension is a human act like any 
other; its reality is praxis. The concept of comprehension for Sartre is therefore one 
that, in general, is indistinguishable from “immediate existence”. In other words, 
human existence is comprehension, they are one and the same, both found in the 
movement of reality, in praxis. Comprehension is a human act that at once reproduces 
and constructs new Institutions. What this epistemology implies is that facts of the 
sort searched for by Durkheim do not exist in human reality, the best that can be 
hoped for is a comprehension of the same dynamic and transformative nature as 
reality itself.  
 That being said, Sartre distinguishes explicit comprehension from this general 
comprehension. Explicit comprehension can be understood as a more formalised 
approach to comprehension, which would be the object of the research of the social 
sciences. Explicit comprehension is one that is aware of the dynamics of the human 
reality that it is trying to understand, that is, that human reality is dialectical. It is with 
regard to explicit comprehension that Sartre outlines his method.  
The method that Sartre prescribes is one of perpetual back and forth, a 
dialectical method for understanding the dialectical dynamic of praxis, the reality of 
human existence or, rather, social reality:  
 
We shall define the method of the existentialist approach as a regressive-
progressive […] method. It is at the same time an enriching cross-reference 
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between the object (which contains the whole period as hierarchised 
significations) and the period (which contains the object in its totalisation). In 
fact, when the object is rediscovered in its profundity and in its particularity, 
then instead of remaining external to the totalisation […] it enters immediately 
into contradiction with it. In short, the simple inert juxtaposition of epoch and 
the object gives way abruptly to a living conflict. (Sartre 1968, pp.148-149) 
 
I understand this passage by the terms “object” and “the period” respectively referring 
to human agency and Institutional structures. Sartre’s method begins by a regressive 
step. The aim of this regressive step is to understand the period, that is, the 
Institutional structures that act on the object of social inquiry. This step reconstitutes 
the biography of the social object to be studied, that is, situates it within its socio-
historical context, which I equate once again with Institutional structures. One 
attempts, by whichever means one may find, to paint a picture of the conditioning 
forces present in this context. Sartre refers to the Institutional makeup of a specific 
socio-historical context as the “totalisation”. It is only once this picture has been 
exhaustively painted that one can then turn to the progressive step. 
 The progressive step attempts to situate the praxis of the human action within 
these Institutional structures to expose the divergences of these actions from the 
conditioning forces at play. This is what Sartre means when he says, “the object is 
rediscovered in its profundity and in its particularity”. The praxis of human action 
will always diverge, at least in part, from the conditioning of Institutions. Actions will 
never follow their conditioning exactly. This would be impossible as neither this 
conditioning itself nor its source, Institutions, are exact. This is what Sartre means 
when he says “it enters immediately into contradiction with it”. This progressive step 
may be best understood as looking at what people actually did while maintaining an 
awareness of the forces theorised to be acting upon these human beings.  
 One must then repeat the regressive step such that, in light of the divergences 
analysed, one might be able to enquire as to the manner in which these divergences of 
transformative human agency served to alter the Institutional structure first 
established. This method then continues as a cross-reference, a continual back and 
forth. This is the “living conflict” to which Sartre refers. This can be understood as 
this dialectical dynamic of conditioning and construction in the movement of praxis.   
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 Explicit comprehension cannot understand the object itself but simply the 
dynamic of its existence. It is therefore paramount that one is aware of the limits of 
what can be known in the peculiar discipline of social science, which Sartre refers to 
as anthropology: 
 
Anthropology will deserve its name only if it replaces the study of human 
objects by the study of the various processes of becoming-an-object. Its role is 
to found its knowledge on rational and comprehensive non-knowledge; that is, 
the historical totalisation will be possible only if anthropology understands 
itself instead of ignoring itself. To understand itself, to understand the other, to 
exist, to act are one and the same movement which founds direct, conceptual 
knowledge upon indirect, comprehensive knowledge but without ever leaving 
the concrete – that is, history or, more precisely, the one who comprehends 
what he knows. This perpetual dissolution of intellection in comprehension 
and conversely, the perpetual redescent which introduces comprehension into 
intellection as a dimension of rational non-knowledge at the heart of 
knowledge is the very ambiguity of a discipline in which the questioner, the 
question, and the questioned are one. (Sartre, 1968, p.174)  
 
This return to epistemology is important because it is necessary to reaffirm Sartre’s 
ambitions for his own method. Precisely, with regard to the regressive step of the 
method outlined above, the “historical totalisation” – the Institutional makeup of a 
socio-historical context – can only be known to the extent to which one knows 
themselves and the limits of their own knowledge. More generally, the method is only 
able to create comprehension of the dialectic of human existence: the arrival at 
conclusions of any sort will only ever, if even achievable, be temporary. Furthermore, 
as this comprehension is a social act like any other, its own dynamic is dialectical 
which is what Sartre is referring to with regard to the “perpetual dissolution of 
intellection in comprehension”. It is also an act of praxis and is therefore 
transformative of the very thing it is trying to understand. Comprehension must be 
undertaken with a strong self-awareness of its limits, which are great.  
Sartre’s methodology is one in which knowledge is deemed to be dynamic and 
transformative in the same way as the reality that it is trying to understand. In 
understanding this reality, one must understand that the nature of knowledge is 
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nothing more than comprehension, which cannot hope to arrive at any kind of fixed 
conclusion. Sartre therefore prescribes to take what we know from our philosophical 
beliefs, our ontology, that there exists at once constructive transformative human 
agency and conditioning social structures and attempt to comprehend their dialectical 
relationship in a dialectical manner. A theory of the Institutions in question is to be 
developed, then a reconstruction of the events that actually happened is analysed, then 
the effect of this on the Institutional structures is theorised, then the actual events are 
re-examined, and so on and so forth.  
The epistemology and method prescribed by Sartre are both of a pluralist 
nature. If comprehension is simply life, then a plurality of comprehensions is possible. 
Likewise, if the method prescribed is simply dialectical to mirror the dialectic of 
Sartre’s social ontology, then a plurality of methods is acceptable in attempting to 
theorise the Institutional makeup of a society. This same plurality applies with regard 
to analysing the actual events that have taken place. We are therefore left in a position 
that could be accused of methodological relativism. A priori, no limits are seemingly 
placed on this methodological pluralism. This is the issue with attempting to 
formulate a general social scientific methodology, as I now demonstrate further.  
 
4.3 Lawson’s Methodology 
Lawson (1997, 2003, 2006, 2012, 2013) has provided the framework for this thesis 
and arguably has the most clarity with regard to the methodological issues posed by 
the analysis of the social realm and the manner in which one should approach these 
issues. Lawson therefore provides a picture of methodology that is clear and 
particularly self-aware. This being said, many of the ideas already stated are 
reproduced in Lawson’s work.  
 
4.3.1 Lawson: Retroduction and Contrast Explanation 
As Lawson’s ontology has previously been discussed in Chapters One and Three of 
this thesis, I will now consider Lawson’s epistemology.  
Lawson joins Sartre in affirming that a postmodern social ontology implies 
that knowledge must be considered a socially constructed entity like anything else 
that exists in the social world. “[K]nowledge must be recognised as a produced means 
of production […]. Knowledge is a social product” (Lawson, 1997, p.25). As I have 
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already outlined, this implies that knowledge is temporary and changing. 
Furthermore, knowledge is dialectical: 
 
I am here rejecting positivistic or, more generally, monistic accounts of 
knowledge […]. And I am reaffirming the familiar realist insight that 
knowledge […] is a two-way process. Through confronting “objects” of study 
we learn not only about them but simultaneously about ourselves […]. 
Knowledge […] is intrinsically a transformational process. […] Although the 
analytical moment, the elaboration and utilisation of surface patterns, has a 
role to play in explanatory research, it does not exhaust the latter. Rather the 
knowledge process is fundamentally dialectical. (Lawson, 2003, p.101)  
 
Knowledge is an Institution just like any other. It is dialectical, changing, and is 
reproduced and transformed by the actions of human beings.  
 Lawson, however, like Sartre, does not leave his analysis of the epistemology 
of social reality here. He specifies that, “knowledgeability presupposes that the social 
structures acted upon are enduring to some degree” (Lawson, 1997, p.34). Lawson 
adds the requirement that knowledge be “relatively enduring”. As knowledge exists 
with the same dynamic as the social structures that it is attempting to understand, 
these social structures are therefore assumed to be “relatively enduring” such that the 
knowledge of them may “relatively endure”. It is recognised that social structures and 
knowledge are transformational. However, Lawson assumes that there will be some 
continuity in their existence as he posits this as a requirement for one’s understanding 
of them. “The scientific objective is to identify relatively enduring structures and to 
understand their characteristic ways of acting” (Lawson, 1997, p.23). Lawson 
therefore sets out to understand these relatively enduring structures.  
First, Lawson seeks to identify a new form of reasoning appropriate to the 
understanding of social reality. The former dichotomy of deduction and induction is 
argued to be inappropriate for this kind of analysis. Lawson proposes as its 
replacement what he calls retroduction: 
 
[T]he central mode of inference is neither deduction or induction. Rather it is 
retroduction. […] Not much can be said about this process of retroduction 
independent of context other than it is likely to operate under a logic of 
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analogy or metaphor and to draw heavily on the investigator’s perspective, 
beliefs and experience. (Lawson 1997, p.212) 
 
Retroduction is the kind of pluralist reasoning required by the social realm. It is a 
form of reasoning that embraces subjectivity as inescapable and uses it, with self-
awareness, to approach the understanding of the social object to be understood.  This 
mode of reasoning allows for a plurality of methods of understanding and corresponds 
to the epistemology and ontology already outlined.  
 Lawson’s method is “contrast explanation”. The method of explanation and 
understanding appropriate to the social sciences is one in which an explanation is 
given with regard to events that differ from a perceived norm. In other words, things 
are explained that someone deems require explanation. There are only two essential 
requirements for contrast explanation but they raise three problems when this method 
is applied to the social realm: 
 
The first essential ingredient is an informed […] judgement about conditions 
operating over some contrast space […]. All that is required of any judgement 
is that it be suitably informed. It is not necessary that the judgement be wholly 
correct. […] The second essential ingredient in contrast explanation is that a 
relation between outcomes within the contrast space is eventually recorded 
that is regarded by the researcher (or whoever) as surprising or in some way of 
concern or interest. […] The three-part problem that arises in situations 
lacking the possibility of producing the sorts of regularity often achieved in 
controlled experimental contexts, lies in determining how even to start the 
analysis, how to direct it to get at a specific aspect of a causal mechanism, and 
how to discriminate between competing hypotheses. (Lawson, 2003, pp.92-
93)  
 
In response to the first problem, that of how to start, Lawson states that “[a]n entry 
point can be occasioned by feelings of surprise, doubt, concern or interest, that 
accompany some contrastive observations” (Lawson, 2003, p.93). Essentially, 
Lawson deems the starting point of analysis to be any situation in which an individual 
may feel as though something needs to be explained.  
 48 
With regard to the manner in which to direct the ensuing analysis, “[t]he move 
from phenomenon to cause rests on a logic of analogy and metaphor, luck and 
ingenuity, here as everywhere else” (Lawson, 2003, pp.94-95). No real method is 
prescribed as it is argued that the appropriate direction and explanation will not only 
be specific to the context of explanation but will also be strongly linked to the 
subjective preferences of the investigator.  
Finally, with regard to the manner in which we are to discriminate between 
different explanations, as this theory prescribes a priori legitimacy to almost any 
explanation:  
 
The rational course of action is to persevere with the hypothesis that has the 
greater explanatory power, that accommodates the widest range of evidence, 
and to see if its explanatory failures, where they exist, can be accounted for by 
countervailing factors, and so on. (Lawson, 2003, pp.97-98) 
 
Lawson remains consistently vague on this point. It seems as though what is really 
argued here is that critique is essential. Of course it seems logical to persevere with 
the best explanation. However, “best” is a problematic tag. I imagine therefore that 
Lawson is saying that, through peer review, theories will be judged subjectively by 
how well academic peers believe they explain certain things. When a theory explains 
something well, it will be retained. This though seems to be the state of things 
currently, with Lawson’s argument being that “Science everywhere is a messy 
business” (Lawson, 2003, p.98).  
 Such a position is surprising as Lawson’s theory is fundamentally one of 
discriminating between theories. Lawson’s position is that theories imply ontologies 
and can be judged by the proximity of those ontologies to reality. However, when it 
comes to discriminating between theories employing a pluralist method, this method 
of discrimination is nowhere to be seen. This is the problem; it is assumed that 
methodological pluralism is sufficient to guarantee an a posteriori respect of 
postmodern social ontology. I restate that this is not the case. 
Lawson’s methodology is one of quite individual explanation where the tools 
available to introspection are indiscriminately advocated as possible routes to 
explanation. It is a method that is pluralist. One can embark on an explanation in 
almost whichever manner one pleases. This results in a similar methodological 
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relativism to that which I have accused Sartre of. The forgotten normative framework 
of Heterodox Economic Methodology is, in this situation, and with regard to 
Lawson’s aim to build a “realist” economics, of the utmost importance. 
 
4.3.2 Sartre and Lawson 
On the question of epistemology, Sartre and Lawson are on the same page. 
Understandings of a changing and transformational nature can be produced with 
regard to social reality. This knowledge is a part of social reality and is therefore of an 
Institutional nature like anything else. That being said, Sartre and Lawson both make 
concessions to this position, respectively, through the concepts of “explicit 
comprehension” and the relatively enduring nature of social structures. Sartre and 
Lawson do this to make possible the production of the kind of knowledge that could 
constitute social science.  
 On the question of method Sartre and Lawson are also very similar. They say 
that the object of explanation can be anything that one deems requires explanation. 
Lawson names this a contrastive observation. Lawson makes the assumption that 
things will only require explanation if they arouse some kind of surprise or interest. 
Lawson then argues that the manner in which investigation should take place is 
context-specific and will most probably be indicated by surprise or interest. Sartre, 
however, is more specific and argues that one should do one’s best to first elaborate 
the Institutional makeup of the context in which the object of interest has occurred. 
Then, and only then, should the event of interest be examined to analyse divergences 
between this event and the Institutional structure. The transformative effects of the 
event should then be theorised before returning to the event itself, and so on and so 
forth. Sartre specifies the manner in which one should direct analysis.  
Sartre conceives of a never-ending explanatory process whereas Lawson 
conceives of explanations being arrived at, compared and contrasted and then 
reformulated, and so on. This is not a difference of substance. Both see knowledge to 
be changing and transformative. Sartre simply sees a process of continuous 
explanation whereas Lawson sees pauses of agreement in explanation. Lawson and 
Sartre’s inferences with regard to epistemology and methodology, in the same manner 
as their social ontologies, are largely the same. 
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Sartre and Lawson infer, from a postmodern social ontology, that the 
epistemology and method, and therefore methodology consistent with this ontology, 
are pluralist. I am convinced by Sartre and Lawson’s analyses that this is the only 
general methodological prescription that is consistent with a postmodern social 
ontology. However, at the level of abstraction of methodology, Sartre and Lawson 
both find it difficult to place any real restrictions upon this methodology. It pretty 
much becomes an “anything goes” approach that results in theories being mistakenly 
thought as respectful of postmodern social ontology. An a priori belief in postmodern 
social ontology coupled with methodological pluralism is assumed to guarantee an a 
posteriori respect of social ontology. 
 This is evidenced by Orléan prescribing Durkheim’s method as that which 
should govern a general social science. Lawson then deems the following theories to 
follow methods respectful of postmodern social ontology: 
 
Hayek’s theory of spontaneous order; Smith on the division of labour; 
Keynes’ explanation of investment volatility […]; Marx’s analysis of 
capitalism […] contemporary institutionalist, post-Keynesian, Austrian and 
Marxian traditions. I also find significant overlap with […] feminist 
economics. (Lawson, 1997, p.247) 
 
I have demonstrated, at the very least, that both Marx and Smith, by the labour theory 
of value, presuppose an ontology that Heterodox Economic Methodology would 
judge as unrealistic. Therefore, the assumption that an a priori belief in postmodern 
social ontology, coupled with methodological pluralism, will result in theories that a 
posteriori presuppose the same postmodern social ontology is wrong. Theories, such 
as Marx and Durkheim’s, complete the two assumed criteria but a posteriori 
presuppose an unrealistic social ontology. Heterodox economic approaches, not to 
mention approaches to understanding the social realm in general, should not be 
excused judgment by the normative framework of Heterodox Economic 
Methodology. Pluralism can presuppose unrealistic ontologies with as much ease as 
the mathematical-deductivist method; they are just harder to spot.  
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4.4 Judging Methodology 
Heterodox Economic Methodology has a fundamental requirement: social theory 
must be “realist”. “Realist” means that the ontology presupposed by a theory’s 
method is consistent with the pre-defined “real” ontology of Heterodox Economic 
Methodology. I have argued that this ontology is postmodern social ontology.  
 First, I have demonstrated in this chapter that a simple belief in postmodern 
social ontology, as I have argued is held by Durkheim, is insufficient to guarantee the 
a posteriori respect of postmodern social ontology. Durkheim is perfectly capable, 
from a starting point of recognising the socially constructed and socio-historically 
nature of Institution, of building a theory that a posteriori attributes to Institutions the 
ontology of classifiable things. This is my first argument: a priori belief in 
postmodern social ontology does not guarantee a posteriori respect of postmodern 
social ontology. 
 The project of Heterodox Economic Methodology is to build a “realist” 
general methodology for social science. The manner in which Heterodox Economic 
Methodology prescribes that this methodology should be built is from the starting 
point of postmodern social ontology. I have analysed two formulations of 
methodology built in this way, those of Sartre and Lawson, and have demonstrated 
that they arrive at the same general conclusion. The consistently inferred 
epistemology and methodology, from the starting point of postmodern social 
ontology, are pluralist. I believe this to be the correctly inferred methodological 
prescription for a general methodology for the social sciences. 
 However, I have also demonstrated in this chapter that methodological 
pluralism is insufficient to guarantee the a posteriori respect of postmodern social 
ontology. The argument underpinning this entire thesis is that heterodox – that is 
pluralist – theories can presuppose an unrealistic social ontology. Furthermore, even 
theories that believe in a postmodern social ontology and employ a pluralist 
methodology are able employ methods that presuppose an unrealistic social ontology. 
The prime example of this is Marx. This is my second argument: the combination of 
an a priori belief in postmodern social ontology and methodological pluralism does 
not guarantee the a posteriori respect of postmodern social ontology. The question to 
ask now is: why does it not? 
 52 
 It does not because the methodological project of Heterodox Economic 
Methodology is on the front line of a paradigm shift. The ontology posited by 
Heterodox Economic Methodology as the judge, jury, and executioner of social 
theory, is in fact a revolutionary ontology, in radical opposition to the ontology that 
previously underpinned philosophy. This previous ontology, one in which social 
structures were posited as having the ontology of Substances/Essences, was the reality 
of the previous philosophical paradigm: modernism. The ontology of 
Substance/Essence, I have argued, is structurally required by theory built within this 
paradigm. To develop a methodology that would structurally presuppose, or guarantee 
a respect of, postmodern social ontology, would require a radical split from previous 
theorisation. This seems quite unfathomable with the extent that modernism has 
influenced the western world as we know it. A general methodology for social science 
that would structurally presuppose a postmodern social ontology would require, 
currently, an impossible revolution in thought.  
 Thus at the present time the best methodological prescription that can 
generally be made to those disciplines that study the social realm is, first, to recognise 
and keep in mind the Institutional nature of social reality and, secondly, to employ a 
pluralist methodology. But this is not enough for “realism”.   
That being said, what we do have is a normative framework by which the 
methods of theories can be judged with regard to their proximity to postmodern social 
ontology. It is through the general application of this normative framework to social 
theories that the greatest progress will be made towards building a community of 
theorists that respect postmodern social ontology. We cannot guarantee a priori that a 
theorist will conform to the criterion of Heterodox Economic Methodology: 
“realism”. This same school, however, provides a framework that can weed out those 
theories that do not. Until a general revolution in thought occurs, a posteriori 
judgement is the best we can do in the fight for “realism”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 53 
Conclusion 
 
In this thesis, I set out to analyse The Empire of Value. I specifically sought to 
examine the analysis of the “theory of value” in economics. Orléan provides the novel 
observation that the utility and labour theories of value both employ a method that 
results in attributing to value the ontology of a Substance/Essence. Orléan rejects this 
ontology on the basis that it is unrealistic. Generally then, Orléan argues that a 
Substance/Essence ontology of social structures in unrealistic. In reality, social 
structures, including value, are Institutions. I analysed Orléan’s theory by inferring the 
ontology that it presupposes, which remains undefined in The Empire of Value. 
 This approach is based on the work of Lawson, who I have included more 
generally as belonging to the school of thought that I have named Heterodox 
Economic Methodology. This school posits that social theory must be “realist”. By 
“realist”, Heterodox Economic Methodology means consistent with a pre-defined 
ontology deemed “real”. I divided this theory into two parts, a normative framework 
and a methodological project. The normative framework stipulates that ontology can 
be inferred from method, this ontology can then be judged based on its proximity to 
the pre-defined “real” ontology. Theory is “realist” if these two are consistent. 
Otherwise, theory is unrealistic. The methodological project is then that a general 
social scientific methodology can be built upon a “real” social ontology. Orléan has 
the same approach except that he judges ontology as unrealistic without comparison 
to a pre-defined “real” ontology.  
 I have argued that the “real” ontology presupposed by Orléan is postmodern. 
What I mean by this is that the philosophy that underpins the rejection of a 
Substance/Essence ontology of social structures, and its replacement by an 
Institutional ontology of social structures, is a philosophy that was developed by 
opposing a different philosophical position. Moreover, I have argued that the 
philosophy opposed is not just any but the previously prevailing modernist paradigm. 
A Substance/Essence ontology of social structures underpinned western thought until 
the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, rejecting this position is part of a 
paradigm shift. I have argued that Lawson and Orléan share the same belief as to the 
reality of social ontology. Therefore, I have argued that the ontology fundamental to 
Heterodox Economic Methodology is postmodern social ontology.  
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 This has an important implication for the methodological project of Heterodox 
Economic Methodology. This means that the general social scientific methodology to 
be developed requires a revolutionary shift in thought, which seems currently 
impossible. I have proposed this as the explanation for the failure of this general 
methodology to guarantee the “realism” required by Heterodox Economic 
Methodology. Although methodological pluralism is currently the best 
methodological prescription available for social science, I have demonstrated that this 
is insufficient to guarantee “realism”. Hence, the methodological project of Heterodox 
Economic Methodology fails in its main aim. The building of a general social 
scientific methodology is not currently the best course of action in aiming to spread 
“realism”.  
We can, however, judge the “realism” of theories. This is for the moment a 
technique that is largely neglected with regard to those theories that can be classified 
as “heterodox” by their use of a pluralist methodology. Although a priori it is 
unfeasible to guarantee the methodological respect of postmodern social ontology, a 
posteriori it is possible to judge whether the methods employed by theories 
presuppose a postmodern social ontology. Therefore, I suggest that the best course of 
action in aiming to spread “realism” in social science is the general judgment of social 
theories by the normative framework of Heterodox Economic Methodology.   
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Appendix A  
 
Extraits – L’empire de la valeur19  
 
I. La définition d’une Institution 
« Selon la belle définition qu'en donnent Paul Fauconnet et Marcel Mauss: ‘Qu'est-ce 
en effet qu'une institution sinon un ensemble d'actes ou d'idées tout institué que les 
individus trouvent devant eux et qui s'imposent plus ou moins à eux? Il n'y a aucune 
raison pour réserver exclusivement, comme on le fait d'ordinaire, cette expression aux 
arrangements sociaux fondamentaux. Nous entendons donc par ce mot aussi bien les 
usages et les modes, les préjugés et les superstitions, que les constitutions politiques 
ou les organisations juridiques essentielles ; car tous ces phénomènes sont de même 
nature et ne diffèrent qu'en degré. L'institution est en somme dans l'ordre social ce 
qu'est la fonction dans l'ordre biologique: et de même que la science de la vie est la 
science des fonctions vitales, la science de la société est la science des institutions 
ainsi définies’ (‘La sociologie: objet et méthode’, in Marcel Mauss, Œuvres, tome III: 
Cohésion sociale et divisions de la sociologie, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1974, p. 
150). » p.212 
 
II. La Valeur 
« Pour le dire succinctement, nous refusons d'admettre que la valeur marchande 
puisse s'identifier à une substance, comme l'utilité, qui préexiste aux échanges. Il faut 
plutôt la considérer comme une création sui generis des rapports marchands, par 
laquelle la sphère économique accède à une existence séparée, indépendante des 
autres activités sociales. Les relations marchandes possèdent leur propre logique de 
valorisation dont la finalité n'est pas la satisfaction des consommateurs mais 
l'extension indéfinie du règne de la marchandise. Que, pour ce faire, la marchandise 
prenne appui sur le désir d'utilité des individus est possible, et même avéré, mais 
l'utilité n'entre dans la valorisation que comme une composante parmi d'autres. Il n'y a 
pas lieu d'enfermer la valeur marchande dans cette seule logique. La quête de prestige 
que manifestent les luttes de distinction est un aiguillon également puissant du rapport 
                                                
19 Orléan, A., (2011), L’empire de la valeur, Seuil, Paris.  
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aux objets. Plus généralement, dans de multiples situations, la valeur se trouve 
recherchée pour elle-même, en tant que pouvoir d'achat universel. Notre projet de 
refondation trouve ici sa définition: saisir la valeur marchande dans son autonomie, 
sans chercher à l'identifier à une grandeur préexistante, comme l'utilité, le travail ou 
la rareté. » p.12 
 
« [U]ne constatation préliminaire s'impose: la théorie de la valeur utilité partage avec 
la théorie de la valeur travail une manière identique de concevoir la valeur et son 
objectivité, sans équivalent dans les autres sciences sociales. Toutes deux y voient 
l'effet d'une « substance » ou qualité que les biens marchands posséderaient en propre. 
Cette hypothèse que nous nommerons « hypothèse substantielle » tend à « naturaliser 
les rapports économiques. En accordant la primauté aux objets, elle construit une « 
économie des grandeurs » au détriment d'une « économie des relations ». Mettre au 
jour cette structure conceptuelle permet de comprendre que les impasses actuelles de 
la théorie économique ont des racines profondes. Y remédier passe nécessairement 
par une « refondation » conceptuelle. Il s'agit de promouvoir un nouveau cadre global 
d'intelligibilité appréhendant la réalité économique sous une nouvelle perspective. Par 
ailleurs, cette analyse, parce qu'elle permet de faire émerger, par-delà la coupure entre 
classiques et marginalistes, une structure conceptuelle commune, établit l'unité 
profonde de la pensée économique et en révèle l'origine : l'hypothèse substantielle. Ce 
résultat ne doit pas être négligé. La prétention à une scientificité poppérienne comme 
la revendication d'autonomie à l'égard des autres sciences sociales comptent parmi ses 
expressions les plus notables. On les trouve présentes chez des auteurs que par ailleurs 
tout, ou presque, oppose. C'est cette tradition qui doit aujourd'hui être transformée. » 
pp.22-23 
 
« L’hypothèse substantielle 
La tradition économique nomme « théorie de la valeur » les approches qui cherchent à 
découvrir le secret de l’échangeabilité marchande dans l’hypothèse d’une 
« substance » ou qualité conférant aux biens une valeur intrinsèque. Le plus souvent, 
ce livre se conformera à l’usage et retiendra la qualification usuelle de « théorie de la 
valeur » pour les désigner, mais sans jamais perdre de vue que, sous cette appellation 
d’apparence générale et neutre, se cache en fait une conception très particulière. 
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Lorsqu’il s’agira de les distinguer d’autres approches, le terme, plus lourd mais plus 
précis, de « théorie substantielle de la valeur », ou encore de « théorie de la valeur 
substance », sera utilisé. Historiquement, deux « substances » ont été prises en 
considération par les économistes : le travail et l’utilité. Cependant, quelle que soit la 
substance considérée, ces approches partages la même conception princeps selon 
laquelle, pour penser l’échange, il convient d’aller par-delà l’apparence des 
transactions monétaires de façon à mettre en évidence la présence d’une grandeur 
cachée qui préexiste logiquement aux transactions et les organise. L’idée d’une valeur 
objective ordonnant de l’extérieur l’anarchie apparente des échanges marchands 
trouve dans ce corps de doctrine son hypothèse fondatrice. Elle façonne en profondeur 
le regard que les économistes portent sur la réalité. Il s’agit de faire apparaître ce qui 
est dissimulé : la loi de la valeur qui, à l’insu des échangistes, commande aux 
transactions. Il y a des échanges parce qu’il y a de la valeur et cette valeur se présente 
comme une qualité que possèdent en propre les biens marchands. 
Ainsi, Léon Walras commence-t-il ses Éléments d’économie politique pure par 
une spécification de ce qu’est la richesse sociale en partant de la notion de rareté: 
«J'appelle richesse sociale l'ensemble des choses matérielles ou immatérielles qui sont 
rares, c'est-à-dire qui, d'une part, nous sont utiles, et qui, d'autre part, n'existent à 
notre disposition qu'en quantité limitée. » Comme on le note, cette définition de la 
rareté renvoie à des réalités indépendantes de l'échange, à savoir l'utilité et une 
quantité limitée. Il énonce ensuite que la rareté, propriété objective, est ce qui confère 
de la valeur aux objets et fonde, de ce fait, l'échange. La nature de la valeur est ainsi 
totalement spécifiée par des critères objectifs. L'échange en découle logiquement. 
Comme le dit Walras lui-même, le fait de l'échange est déduit a priori de cette 
substance spécifique qu'il nomme « rareté ». Une fois la valeur explicitée dans la 
première section des Éléments d'économie politique pure, Walras passe à l'étude de 
l'échange de deux marchandises entre elles (section II), puis à celle de l'échange de 
plusieurs marchandises entre elles (section III). Il démontre que, à l'état d'équilibre, le 
rapport des valeurs est égal au rapport des raretés. Ce n'est qu'en tout dernier lieu que 
la monnaie se trouve introduite. Cette progression valeur, troc, monnaie est 
caractéristique de l'hypothèse substantielle.  
Pour ce qui est de la théorie de la valeur travail, elle trouve son expression la 
plus aboutie chez Karl Marx. Dans le premier chapitre du Capital, Marx considère 
deux marchandises, du froment et du fer, et il observe que, dans l'échange, «une 
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quantité donnée de froment est réputée égale à une quantité quelconque de fer ». À 
partir de cette observation, il s'interroge sur ce que signifie cette égalité. Il répond: « 
C'est que [dans ces deux objets différents, le froment et le fer], il existe quelque chose 
de commun. » En conséquence, il cherche à déterminer ce « quelque chose de 
commun ». Selon lui, ce « quelque chose de commun » ne peut pas être « une 
propriété naturelle quelconque, géométrique, physique, chimique, etc. » Plus 
largement, il écarte tout ce qui est de l'ordre de la valeur d'usage. Il conclut avec 
assurance : « La valeur d'usage des marchandises une fois mise de côté, il ne reste 
plus qu'une qualité, celle d'être des produits du travail » ! Plus loin, il précise : « Tous 
ces objets ne manifestent plus qu'une chose, c'est que dans leur production une force 
de travail humaine a été dépensée [...]. En tant que cristaux de cette substance sociale 
commune, ils sont réputés valeurs. » En l'occurrence, cette «substance sociale 
commune » est mesurée par le temps de travail socialement nécessaire à la production 
des biens. Il écrit : «Nous connaissons maintenant la substance de la valeur: c'est le 
travail. Nous connaissons la mesure de sa quantité: c'est la durée du travail. »  
A l'évidence, chez Marx, la valeur substance a le statut d'une hypothèse a 
priori qui structure le regard de l'économiste et lui dicte ce qu'il doit voir. Elle est une 
construction conceptuelle et non pas un fait d'observation. Certes Marx cherche à 
persuader son lecteur qu'il suffirait d'examiner attentivement les échanges pour que la 
valeur travail se révélât à ses yeux. Mais sa démonstration n'est guère convaincante. 
Pourquoi rejeter la valeur d'usage comme source potentielle de la valeur? Ou encore, 
une fois celle-ci rejetée, pourquoi ne resterait-il que le travail humain pour justifier la 
commensurabilité ?  
Ces deux auteurs illustrent parfaitement l'hypothèse substantielle. Il s'est agi 
pour Marx comme pour Walras de mettre au jour une grandeur, le travail socialement 
nécessaire, pour le premier ; la rareté pour le second, qui fonde la valeur et, ce faisant, 
l'échange. La force de cette construction tient au fait que ces grandeurs peuvent être 
calculées sans référence aux échanges. Une fois l'économie marchande spécifiée par 
ses productions et ses consommations, il est possible de calculer la valeur de toutes 
les marchandises. Ces grandeurs peuvent être dites objectives. Ceci est clair pour 
Marx. C'est également vrai de Walras mais demandera quelques explications 
supplémentaires dans la mesure où l'objectivité de l'utilité renvoie à des préférences 
individuelles qui sont subjectives. Cependant, dès lors que ces dernières sont 
supposées exogènes, rien ne les distingue plus des fonctions de production. Elles sont 
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tout autant objectives du point de vue du théoricien de la valeur. Elles sont des 
données à partir desquelles les valeurs se déduisent. » pp.24-27 
 
III. Marx 
« Le fétichisme de la marchandise  
Lorsque, à la lumière de tous nos résultats précédents, on examine l'hypothèse 
substantielle dans la globalité de ses déterminations, il apparaît nettement qu'elle 
avance une conception du monde marchand centrée sur les objets. Elle ne met qu'au 
second plan les rapports des acteurs entre eux dans la mesure où l'intelligibilité des 
faits économiques primordiaux, comme les prix et les volumes échangés, repose 
intégralement sur le calcul des valeurs. Pour désigner cette spécificité si forte, il sera 
dit que la tradition économique privilégie une « économie des grandeurs » au 
détriment d'une « économie des relations ». Cette manière de faire n'a rien de 
choquant a priori, dans la mesure où elle réfléchit un fait propre aux économies 
marchandes: les individus séparés y entrent en relation non pas directement mais par 
l'intermédiaire de la circulation des marchandises. C'est par le biais de l'objectivité des 
valeurs que les producteurs-échangistes font l'expérience du social. Ce faisant, la 
primauté des grandeurs, sous la forme du « combien », s'impose à la conscience de 
tous les protagonistes. De ce point de vue, la théorie de la valeur est fidèle à la 
manière dont les économies marchandes se présentent aux acteurs: la valeur et ses 
évolutions s'imposent à eux à la manière d'une puissance naturelle face à laquelle ils 
sont impuissants. « Ces [quantités de valeur] changent sans cesse, indépendamment 
de la volonté et des prévisions des producteurs aux yeux desquels leur propre 
mouvement social prend ainsi la forme d'un mouvement des choses, mouvement qui 
les mène, bien loin qu'ils puissent le diriger. » Les théories de la valeur collent à 
l'expérience commune d'une valorisation objective qui échappe à la « volonté et aux 
prévisions ». La question se pose alors de savoir quel est le statut de cette 
représentation. Est-elle la vérité ultime des économies marchandes?  
Cette question trouve son analyse la plus fouillée chez Marx lorsqu'il introduit 
ce qu'il nomme le « fétichisme de la marchandise » dans le premier chapitre du 
Capital. Il s'agit précisément pour lui d'étudier la perception que les acteurs ont des 
marchandises, comme des « êtres indépendants, doués de corps particuliers, en 
communication avec les hommes et entre eux ». À rebours de cette manière de voir 
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commune aux individus marchands, Marx souligne que la valeur est un fait social, 
produit spécifiquement par la séparation marchande, et en rien une grandeur « 
naturelle ». Il écrit: « La forme valeur et le rapport de valeur des produits du travail 
n'ont absolument rien à faire avec leur nature physique. C'est seulement un rapport 
social déterminé des hommes entre eux qui revêt ici pour eux la forme fantastique 
d'un rapport des choses entre elles. » Pour Marx, de la même manière que certains 
peuples considèrent faussement telle ou telle propriété comme appartenant en propre 
aux objets fétiches, les acteurs économiques considèrent que la valeur appartient en 
propre à la marchandise, comme une qualité naturelle. Les uns comme les autres ne 
perçoivent pas la nature exacte du phénomène qu'ils ont sous les yeux. Pour autant, 
nous dit Marx, cette manière de voir n'est pas une illusion. Elle est constitutive de la 
réalité marchande: la valeur avance masquée, sous la forme d'une grandeur objective, 
intrinsèque aux marchandises : « elle ne porte pas sur le front ce qu'elle est ». 
Autrement dit, l'abstraction de la valeur est constitutive de la réalité marchande. C'est 
ce que veut dire Marx lorsqu'il écrit: « Les catégories de l'économie bourgeoise sont 
des formes de l'intellect qui ont une vérité objective, en tant qu'elles reflètent des 
rapports sociaux réels, mais ces rapports n'appartiennent qu'à cette époque historique 
déterminée, où la production marchande est le mode de production social. » Ceci 
exprime parfaitement la position subtile de Marx. On trouve, chez Antoine Artous, 
une défense minutieuse d'un tel point de vue :  
 
« Pour Marx, les marchandises sont des choses "sensibles, suprasensibles", les 
formes de pensée ont une objectivité sociale et, somme toute, le rapport social 
ne tient pas debout sans les représentations qui l'accompagnent et le 
structurent. Dès lors, le phénomène du fétichisme ne relève pas d'une simple 
illusion de conscience - individuelle ou collective -, il ne renvoie pas 
seulement à l'apparence des rapports sociaux, à la surface des choses, il traduit 
le mode d'existence des rapports de production capitalistes, leur forme sociale 
objective. »  
 
Autrement dit, si l'objectivité de la valeur est constitutive de la réalité 
marchande, il importe, pour le théoricien, de ne jamais perdre de vue que cette 
objectivité est le produit historique d'une certaine structure sociale. La valeur n'est pas 
une grandeur naturelle même s'il « semble qu'il existe dans [les marchandises] une 
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propriété de s'échanger en proportions déterminées comme les substances chimiques 
se combinent en proportions fixes ». Le théoricien ne doit pas se laisser prendre à ces 
apparences. Il doit éviter de tomber dans l'illusion fétichiste et, pour ce faire, ne 
jamais oublier que la forme marchandise est le résultat d'un rapport social particulier, 
historiquement déterminé, la production marchande: les objets « ne deviennent des 
marchandises que parce qu'ils sont les produits de travaux privés, exécutés 
indépendamment les uns des autres ». Cette thèse est également au cœur du présent 
livre car celui-ci a pour projet de construire un cadre conceptuel qui pense la valeur 
pour ce qu'elle est, non pas une substance, mais une institution sociale-historique : 
l'institution qui est au fondement de l'économie marchande. Cependant, contrairement 
à Marx, ce livre soutient que, pour être mené à bien, ce projet nécessite absolument de 
rompre avec l'hypothèse substantielle. Cette rupture est cruciale à nos yeux car elle 
nous apparaît comme la condition même pour sortir du fétichisme de la marchandise, 
c'est-à-dire pour penser la nature sociale de la valeur. Nous aurons l'occasion de 
préciser dans les chapitres à venir ce que cela signifie. Mais, avant de faire ceci, il 
importe de répondre à un argument de poids: Marx ne prouve-t-il pas la fausseté de ce 
projet en démontrant par son œuvre même qu'il est possible de faire tenir ensemble, et 
la critique du fétichisme, et l'hypothèse substantielle? Nous voudrions montrer dans la 
suite de cette section qu'il n'en est rien: son adhésion à la théorie de la valeur travail 
conduit Marx, malgré lui, à des positions qui sont en contradiction flagrante avec son 
approche sociale-historique des rapports marchands, en particulier sa critique du 
fétichisme.  
Démontrer ceci, c'est faire comprendre que la valeur substance et la valeur 
institution sont deux approches irréconciliables. Comment une substance, par nature 
éternelle, comme le travail et l’utilité, pourrait-elle donner accès à une conception 
sociale-historique de la valeur ? Il y a là une antinomie irréductible. Au contraire, ce 
qui est pleinement conforme à l’hypothèse substantielle est l’idée qu’il y a toujours eu 
de l’économie marchande, comme il y a toujours eu de la valeur économique : que ce 
soit par le fait du travail auquel les hommes ont toujours été contraints pour assurer 
leur existence, ou que ce soit par le fait des biens utiles dont les hommes ont toujours 
eu besoin. Dans les deux cas, c’est une même conception « naturaliste » des rapports 
économiques qui s’impose au détriment d’une approche historique. Cette pensée 
« naturaliste » peut être défendue mais ce n’est pas celle de Marx. Aussi, comme 
Marx retient l’hypothèse substantielle, cela le conduit, dans certains passages, à 
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s’opposer à lui-même lorsqu’il semble se faire le défenseur d’une interprétation 
transhistorique de la valeur travail. Cette dérive trouve dans la détermination 
quantitative de la valeur travail un terrain particulièrement propice : parce que le 
« temps de travail socialement nécessaire » est une quantité qui peut être calculée 
pour tout produit, quels que soient les rapports de production, c’est naturellement 
qu’on est conduit à le regarder comme étant une grandeur « naturelle », à savoir une 
grandeur vide de rapports sociaux. En effet, rien dans son calcul formel ne fait 
référence aux relations marchandes d’échange. D’ailleurs, de tels calculs ont été 
effectués pour des sociétés non marchandes. Chez Marx, la critique du fétichisme 
n’est pas articulée de l’intérieur à la détermination quantitative de la valeur travail. 
Elle apparaît comme un ajout qui vient spécifier cette dernière de l’extérieur à la 
manière d’une mise en garde. 
Personne mieux que Cornelius Castoriadis n’a mis en évidence cette 
contradiction du texte de Marx, oscillant entre deux conceptions antagoniques. 
Conformément à ce qui vient d’être écrit, il en repère l’origine dans la notion de 
substance, en ce qu’elle renvoie à une qualité « dotée d’une signification absolue », 
manifestant « ce qui était là toujours, depuis toujours et dans le toujours ». Penser 
ainsi, c'est introduire l'existence de déterminations universelles, valides quels que 
soient les rapports sociaux considérés. Castoriadis écrit: « L'antinomie de la pensée de 
Marx est que ce Travail qui modifie tout et se modifie constamment lui-même est en 
même temps pensé sous la catégorie de la Substance/Essence, de ce qui subsiste 
inaltérable [...], ne se modifie pas, ne s'altère pas, subsiste comme fondement 
immuable des attributs et des déterminations changeantes. » Pour illustrer son propos, 
Castoriadis rappelle que Marx lui-même montre Robinson, dans son île, procédant à 
une comptabilité de son temps de travail dans le but final d'établir une allocation de 
celui-ci entre ses diverses activités productives « selon la plus ou moins grande 
difficulté qu'il a à vaincre pour obtenir l'effet utile qu'il a en vue » ; ce qui, en bon 
langage économiste, se traduit par: «maximiser son utilité ». Marx conclut à propos 
des calculs de Robinson: « Son inventaire contient le détail [...] du temps de travail 
que lui coûtent en moyenne des quantités déterminées de ces divers produits. [...] 
Toutes les déterminations essentielles de la valeur y sont contenues. » Autrement dit, 
dans ce passage, la valeur travail se donne à voir comme une catégorie transhistorique 
s'imposant à Robinson comme à l'économie marchande. C'est même vrai, ajoute 
Marx, pour la société communiste à venir pour laquelle « [tout] ce que nous avons dit 
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du travail de Robinson se reproduit, mais socialement et non individuellement ». La 
dimension historiquement déterminée que revendique Marx pour la valeur, comme 
propre à la production marchande, dans de nombreux passages de son œuvre, est ici 
absente. Castoriadis multiplie les exemples de cette oscillation perpétuelle: « Marx 
peut penser la Substance Travail tantôt comme purement physiologique-naturelle, et 
tantôt comme pleinement sociale, tantôt comme transhistorique et tantôt comme liée 
spécifiquement à la phase capitaliste, tantôt comme manifestation de la réification de 
l'homme sous l'exploitation capitaliste et tantôt comme le fondement qui permettrait 
un "calcul rationnel" dans la société à venir'. » Il conclut en soulignant: « La vraie 
borne historique aussi bien d'Aristote que de Marx est la question de l'institution. C'est 
l'impossibilité pour la pensée héritée de prendre en compte le social-historique comme 
mode d'être non réductible à ce qui est "connu" ailleurs. » C'est parce que l'approche 
substantielle est, en sa structure même, oubli de l'institution qu'elle se montre inapte à 
étayer un discours qui pense les faits économiques à la lumière des rapports sociaux 
historiquement constitués qui les ont produits. Il faut donc conclure qu'être fidèle à la 
conception sociale-historique de l'économie capitaliste impose de rompre avec 
l'hypothèse substantielle pour penser l'institution de la valeur. Il y a une contradiction 
entre l'hypothèse d'une substance, dont la validité est par nature universelle, et 
l'insistance à considérer la valeur comme une réalité spécifique à l'ordre marchand. » 
pp. 41-47 
 
IV. Durkheim 
« [L]a valeur économique n'est pas une substance mais une puissance de nature 
spécifiquement sociale, née de la multitude et étendant ses effets à tous les membres 
de celle-ci au travers des représentations qu'elle donne d'elle-même. Une des forces de 
cette conception est qu'elle n'est pas limitée à la seule économie ; on la retrouve dans 
de nombreuses analyses sociologiques. Autrement dit, une fois rejetée l'hypothèse de 
la valeur substance, il est possible d'élaborer un modèle général d'intelligibilité des 
valeurs qui englobe également l'activité économique. Cette perspective unitaire 
occupe une place stratégique dans notre projet : à nos yeux, une véritable refondation 
de l'économie passe nécessairement par l'affirmation de son appartenance à part 
entière aux sciences sociales. Il faut défendre l'idée que le fait économique est un fait 
social comme un autre. Il ne possède en rien une essence particulière qui justifierait 
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une épistémologie spécifique ou une discipline indépendante. Ce point est essentiel : 
selon nous, les sciences sociales relèvent toutes d'une même intelligibilité. Nous 
proposons le terme d'« unidisciplinaire » pour qualifier cette perspective qui vise à 
surmonter les divisions artificielles que connaissent actuellement les sciences sociales, 
en affirmant leur profonde unité conceptuelle. On ne saurait surestimer les 
conséquences d'une telle position, non seulement quant à l'architecture globale des 
sciences sociales, mais également pour ce qui est de la manière dont chacune d'elles 
conçoit son objet. On peut en espérer des avancées considérables, et d'abord pour 
l'économie elle-même qui, prisonnière de sa conception de la valeur substance, est 
fortement limitée dans son aptitude à déchiffrer le capitalisme » pp. 186-187 
 
« Chapitre V – Un cadre unidisciplinaire pour penser la valeur 
Comme toute valeur, religieuse, esthétique, morale ou sociale, la valeur économique a 
la dimension d’un jugement portant sur la puissance des individus ou des objets. Ainsi 
la valeur esthétique est-elle la reconnaissance du degré de puissance de certains 
individus ou objets dans le champ des activités artistiques. La question centrale que 
les valeurs posent aux sciences sociales est celle, énigmatique, de leur objectivité, 
sans laquelle il n’y aurait pas de valeurs au sens propre mais un ensemble épars 
d’estimations subjectives. Durkheim en souligne bien la centralité lorsque, après avoir 
considéré divers jugements de valeur du type « ce tableau a une grande valeur 
esthétique », « ce bijou vaut tant », il note : « Dans tous les cas, j’attribue aux êtres et 
aux choses dont il s’agit un caractère objectif, tout à fait indépendant de la manière 
dont je le sens au moment où je me prononce […]. Toutes ces valeurs existent donc, 
en un sens, en dehors de moi. » Or, souligne Durkheim, la valeur renvoie à une 
capacité à produire du désir chez les sujets. Comment, dans ces conditions, concilier 
ces deux dimension : le désir, d’un côté, et l’objectivité, de l’autre ? Il écrit :  
 
« Ce qui a de la valeur est don à quelque titre ; ce qui est bon est désirable ; 
tout désir est un état intérieur. Et pourtant les valeurs dont il vient d’être 
question ont la même objectivité que des choses. Comment ces deux 
caractères, qui, au premier, abord, semblent contradictoires, peuvent-ils se 
réconcilier ? Comment un état de sentiment peut-il être indépendant du sujet 
qui l’éprouve ? » 
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On aura noté à quel point ce questionnement se retrouve à l’identique chez les 
économistes. Il n’y a rien dans la valeur économique qui, ontologiquement, la 
distingue de ses consœurs des sciences sociales. Durkheim en était si convaincu qu’il 
n’hésite pas à écrire : « Certes, il a des types différents de valeurs, mais ce sont des 
espèces d’un même genre. » Ce qui va produire l’autonomisation de l’économie que 
l’on connaît, ce n’est donc pas la spécificité de la question qui lui est posée – puisque 
cette question est commune à toutes les sciences sociales – mais la particularité de la 
réponse qui lui a été apportée par les économistes. Ceux-ci ont élaboré un cadre 
théorique de la valeur, qui attribue l’objectivité de la valeur économique à l’existence 
d’une substance sociale, travail ou utilité, dont la grandeur peut être mesurée. Sur un 
tel socle, comme on l’a souligné, s’est constituée une tradition de pensée 
indépendante en rupture avec le raisonnement sociologique, ce que nous avons 
nommé une « économie des grandeurs ». Elle a pour trait caractéristique de ne faire 
aucune place aux représentations et aux croyances collectives. On ne saurait imaginer 
rupture plus radicale. 
Tout l’effort théorique poursuivi au long du présent livre vise à réaffirmer la 
loi commune de la valeur pour en finir avec le séparatisme qui caractérise l’économie 
en tant que discipline. Bien qu’elle ait l’apparence d’un nombre, la valeur économique 
est bien une puissance de nature sociale, en l’espèce un pouvoir sur autrui qui prend la 
forme d’une pouvoir d’achat sur les choses, dont l’origine est dans la capture 
universelle des désirs individuels de liquidité. Ce qui demande à être compris est la 
nature de cette puissance : comme un sentiment collectif s’extériorise durablement 
dans un objet ? Cette question a reçu de longs développements de la part des sciences 
sociales. Confiance, affect commun, puissance de la multitude, croyances collectives 
sont les concepts proposés pour en appréhender la nature » pp. 188-190 
 
« [L]a valeur est une puissance qui a pour origine le groupe social, par le biais de la 
mise en commun des passions et des pensées. Introduire cette réalité collective en 
économie constitue une innovation de grande ampleur là où d'ordinaire les 
économistes ne reconnaissent que l'action des volontés privées. Cette réalité n'est pas 
propre à l'économie. Elle est même, aux yeux de Durkheim, caractéristique du « fait 
social ». Il devient alors possible d'imaginer un cadre théorique unidisciplinaire qui 
 66 
mettrait fin au schisme qui déchire les sciences sociales entre économie, d'un coté, et 
sciences historiques de l'autre. » p.199 
 
« Durkheim: une conception unidisciplinaire de la valeur  
Au cœur de toute l'œuvre de Durkheim, on trouve la thèse selon laquelle le groupe 
social est porteur d'une vie psychique d'un genre particulier, possédant une énergie et 
une autorité qu'on ne retrouve pas chez les individus isolés. Durkheim n'utilise pas le 
terme d'« affect commun» mais, lorsqu'il parle de sentiment commun ou de pensée 
collective, c'est bien cette réalité qui est décrite. Cette vie psychique particulière, sui 
generis, joue, selon lui, un rôle crucial dans la réflexion sociologique par le fait qu'elle 
est au fondement des valeurs sociales et de leur autorité:  
 
« Quand les consciences individuelles, au lieu de rester séparées les unes des 
autres, entrent étroitement en rapport, agissent activement les unes sur les 
autres, il se dégage de leur synthèse une vie psychique d'un genre nouveau. 
Elle se distingue d'abord de celle que mène l'individu solitaire, par sa 
particulière intensité. Les sentiments qui naissent et se développent au sein des 
groupes ont une énergie à laquelle n'atteignent pas les sentiments purement 
individuels [...]. C'est, dans les moments d'effervescence [...], que se sont, de 
tous temps, constitués les grands idéaux sur lesquels reposent les civilisations. 
Les périodes créatrices ou novatrices sont précisément celles où, sous 
l'influence de circonstances diverses, les hommes sont amenés à se rapprocher 
plus intimement, où les réunions, les assemblées sont plus fréquentes, les 
relations plus suivies, les échanges d'idées plus actifs [...]. On diminue la 
société quand on ne voit en elle qu'un corps organisé en vue de certaines 
fonctions vitales. Dans ce corps vit une âme : c'est l'ensemble des idéaux 
collectifs. Mais ces idéaux ne sont pas des abstraits, de froides représentations 
intellectuelles, dénuées de toute efficace. Ils sont essentiellement moteurs ; car 
derrière eux, il y a des forces réelles et agissantes: ce sont les forces 
collectives [...]. L'idéal lui-même est une force de ce genre. »  
 
Cette citation est remarquable. Pour Durkheim, ce qui est pensé et senti en 
commun acquiert une emprise extrême sur tous les esprits individuels et les 
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transforme en profondeur. C'est sur ce modèle qu'il rend compte de l'émergence de la 
vie morale et des idéaux collectifs, qui sont une création de l'effervescence du groupe. 
Il n'est pas difficile de reconnaître dans ces « forces réelles et agissantes » 
qu'engendre le groupe social en fusion ce que nous avons nommé la puissance de la 
multitude. Notons avec quelle insistance Durkheim souligne le fait que ces 
représentations collectives sont à proprement parler des forces et non « de froides 
représentations intellectuelles ». Il s'agit bien pour lui de rendre intelligible la 
transformation que connaît l'individu lorsqu'il devient un être social, c'est-à-dire un 
être se conformant à certaines manières de faire, de penser et d'agir. Cette 
transformation n'est pas le produit d'une adhésion intellectuelle, résultant d'une 
analyse rationnelle de la situation, mais bien celui d'une mise en mouvement du désir 
individuel par une puissance plus grande que l'individu. L'individu calque 
mimétiquement son désir sur celui de son modèle : la multitude unie. Par ailleurs, 
l'analyse que propose Durkheim pour rendre intelligible le processus par lequel 
émerge le sentiment commun met fortement en avant le rôle que jouent les 
interactions entre agents afin de créer une étroite corrélation entre les affects 
individuels, ce qu'il nomme une situation d'unisson. On reconnaîtra, dans ce processus 
d'actions et de réactions conduisant à l'unisson, notre dynamique d'interactions 
mimétiques dans laquelle chacun règle son choix sur celui des autres. Autrement dit, 
le sentiment collectif que suscite l'affect commun n'est pas simplement la somme des 
sentiments individuels. Il résulte plutôt d'une mise en écho mimétique des émotions 
individuelles :  
 
«Un sentiment collectif, qui éclate dans une assemblée, n'exprime pas 
simplement ce qu'il y avait de commun entre tous les sentiments individuels. Il 
est quelque chose de tout autre, comme nous l'avons montré. Il est une 
résultante de la vie commune, un produit des actions et des réactions qui 
s'engagent entre les consciences individuelles ; et s'il retentit dans chacune 
d'elles, c'est en vertu de l'énergie spéciale qu'il doit précisément à son origine 
collective. Si tous les cœurs vibrent à l'unisson, ce n'est pas par suite d'une 
concordance spontanée et préétablie ; c'est qu'une même force les meut dans le 
même sens. Chacun est entrainé par tous. »  
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Pour Durkheim, cette autorité particulière que produit le sentiment commun, 
ce que nous avons nommé la puissance de la multitude, joue un rôle fondamental dans 
son cadre théorique puisqu'il y voit l'expression par excellence de ce qui fait la 
spécificité du fait social. C'est là une thèse proprement fondatrice qui demande à être 
rappelée. Pour se faire comprendre, Durkheim prend l'exemple des différents règnes 
naturels et de leur succession hiérarchique : minéral, animal, humain. Chaque fois 
qu'on passe de l'un à l'autre, note-t-il, de nouvelles propriétés émergent que l'ordre 
inférieur ne connaissait pas, alors même que l'ordre supérieur ne résulte que de la 
simple combinaison d'éléments appartenant à l'ordre inférieur. Ainsi, « la cellule 
vivante ne contient rien que des particules minérales [...] et pourtant il est, de toute 
évidence, impossible que les phénomènes caractéristiques de la vie résident dans des 
atomes d'hydrogène, d'oxygène, de carbone et d'azote. [La vie] est dans le tout, non 
dans les parties. » On passe ainsi de la matière (physique) à la vie (biologique) et de la 
vie (biologique) à la conscience (psychique). À chaque fois, une qualité nouvelle se 
fait jour par quoi le nouveau règne se trouve radicalement distingué du règne 
inférieur. C'est selon ce même modèle que Durkheim pense les rapports du social à 
l'individuel : le fait social est au fait individuel ce que le fait psychique est au fait 
biologique et le fait biologique au fait physique. L'autonomie du règne social, son 
irréductibilité aux individus, s'en déduisent directement. Bien que composée 
uniquement d'êtres humains, la société n'en possède pas moins des propriétés que les 
individus ne connaissent pas : « Cette synthèse sui generis qui constitue toute société 
dégage des phénomènes nouveaux, différents de ceux qui se passent dans les 
consciences solitaires. » Mais quelle qualité émergente caractérise le règne social ? 
Quel est son signe distinctif ? Après la matière, la vie et la conscience, quelle est 
l'expression de cette nouvelle complexité? Il est inutile d'insister sur l'importance 
conceptuelle de cette question pour la sociologie naissante. Y répondre, c'est, d'une 
part, découvrir de quoi la sociologie est la science; autrement dit, définir quel est son 
objet d'étude. D'autre part, en établissant que le fait social est irréductible au fait 
individuel, comme le fait individuel au fait biologique, et comme le fait biologique au 
fait physique, le chercheur justifie du même coup qu'il doive exister une sociologie, 
autonome par rapport à la psychologie, comme la psychologie s'est affirmée face à la 
biologie et la biologie face à la physique. Durkheim est à tel point conscient des 
enjeux que recouvre la question « Qu'est-ce qu'un fait social? » qu'il lui consacre tout 
le premier chapitre de son grand livre, Les Règles de la méthode sociologique. Sa 
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réponse est la suivante: le fait social « se reconnaît au pouvoir de coercition externe 
qu'il exerce ou est susceptible d'exercer sur les individus ». Durkheim désigne comme 
caractéristique de la vie sociale cette forme sui generis d'autorité, extérieure aux 
individus, qui les transforme en êtres sociaux, ce qu'il nomme ailleurs « l'autorité 
morale ». Pour Durkheim, le règne social n'existe que par le jeu de cette puissance 
particulière qui brise l'isolement des individus et produit un cadre commun 
d'appartenance, la société. L'expérience du social, c'est toujours l'expérience d'une 
force qui nous dépasse et nous unit. Aussi Durkheim n'hésite-t-il pas à écrire: « Le 
problème sociologique - si l'on peut dire qu'il y a un problème sociologique - consiste 
à chercher, à travers les différentes formes de contraintes extérieures, les différentes 
sortes d'autorité morale qui y correspondent, et à découvrir les causes qui ont 
déterminé ces dernières. » L'erreur, selon lui, consiste à nier cette spécificité du fait 
social en voulant tout expliquer sur la base exclusive des consciences individuelles, en 
quoi on reconnaît une forme extrême d'individualisme méthodologique. Il conteste 
qu'on puisse, de cette manière, expliquer la pression que subissent les êtres sociaux, 
pression qui est au fondement même de la vie collective. Parce qu'elle s'exerce sur les 
volontés individuelles, elle ne saurait en dériver.  
 
« Puisque l'autorité devant laquelle s'incline l'individu quand il agit, sent ou 
pense socialement, le domine à ce point, c'est qu'elle est un produit de forces 
qui le dépassent et dont il ne saurait, par conséquent, rendre compte. Ce n'est 
pas de lui que peut venir cette poussée qu'il subit. [...] En vertu de ce principe, 
la société n'est pas une simple somme d'individus, mais le système formé par 
leur association représente une réalité spécifique qui a ses caractères propres. 
Sans doute, il ne peut rien se produire de collectif si des consciences 
particulières ne sont pas données; mais cette condition nécessaire n'est pas 
suffisante. Il faut encore que ces consciences soient associées, combinées, et 
combinées d'une certaine manière ; c'est de cette combinaison que résulte la 
vie sociale et, par suite, c'est cette combinaison qui l'explique. En s'agrégeant, 
en se pénétrant, en se fusionnant, les âmes individuelles donnent naissance à 
un être, psychique si l'on veut, mais qui constitue une individualité psychique 
d'un genre nouveau [...]. Le groupe pense, sent, agit tout autrement que ne 
feraient ses membres, s'ils étaient isolés. »  
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Pour rendre visible l'étroite proximité d'analyse existant entre la sociologie 
durkheimienne et notre approche, il n'est que de donner son nom à cette autorité 
morale sui generis que produit la fusion du collectif : la puissance de la multitude. 
Ainsi l'affinité des deux conceptions est-elle rendue patente. Elles partagent une 
même conception princeps : à l'origine de la vie sociale se trouvent de puissantes 
forces affectives qui modèlent les comportements individuels. Par ailleurs, ces forces 
possèdent une propriété très énigmatique. Elles peuvent s'investir dans des objets et, 
par ce fait, leur transmettre une partie de leur pouvoir. C'est toute la question de ce 
que Marx a nommé le « fétichisme ». pp.199-205 
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Appendix B 
 
Extracts – The Empire of Value20  
 
I. The Definition of an Institution 
“One recalls the fine definition given by Fauconnet and Mauss: ‘What is an institution 
if not a fully formed set of acts and ideas that individuals find themselves faced with 
and that more or less imposes itself on them? There is no reason to reserve this term 
exclusively for fundamental social arrangements, as is usually done. We therefore 
also intend by it customs and fashions, prejudices and superstitions, as well as 
essential legal structures and political forms or organisation; for all these phenomena 
are of the same nature and differ only in degree. An institution, in sum, is to the social 
order what a function is to the biological order; just as the science of life is a science 
of vital functions, the science of society is a science of institutions thus defined’ 
Fauconnet and Mauss (1901/1967-1968), 150.” p.495 
 
II. Value 
“I refuse to accept that economic value can be identified with a property, whether 
utility or any other, that preexists exchange. It must be considered instead as 
something that is uniquely the creation of market relations, by means of which the 
commercial sphere itself attains a separate existence, independent of other social 
activities. Market relations possess their own logic of valuation, whose purpose is not 
to satisfy the desires of consumers, but to indefinitely expand the dominion of the 
commodity. It is possible, even demonstrable in some cases, that the desire of 
individuals for utility is indispensable in this connection; but utility enters into the act 
of valuation only as an element among others. Market relations encompass a range of 
human impulses, not the least of them being the quest for prestige. Conflicts over 
social position, no less than the urge to acquire useful goods, arise from a certain 
relationship to objects. More generally, value in many situations is sought after for its 
own sake, insofar as it represents a universal purchasing power. My purpose, then, is 
                                                
20 Orléan, A., (2013), The Empire of Value, Translated from French by M.B. DeBevoise, Imitatio, San 
Francisco.  
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to show that market value is an autonomous phenomenon that cannot be reduced to 
any preexisting magnitude such as utility, labour, or scarcity.” p.11 
 
“Before examining it in detail, however, it is important to keep in mind that the utility 
and labour theories conceive of value, and the objectivity of value, in exactly the same 
manner. Unlike any of the other social sciences, economics sees value as the 
consequence of a substance, or quality, that is peculiar to exchangeable commodities. 
This assumption, which I shall call the substance hypothesis, adopts a quantitative 
perspective that, in granting primacy to goods themselves, pays little or no attention to 
the social relationship on which economic behaviour is based. The new perspective 
that I hope to establish seeks to go beyond the disagreements between the classical 
and neoclassical traditions, and to demonstrate that there is a profound unity in 
economic thought, and that it has its origin in the substance hypothesis. The 
pretension of economics to the status of a science in Karl Popper’s sense of the term is 
part of a larger claim, as I have already mentioned, to preeminence among the social 
sciences. It is this claim, which one finds in authors who quarrel about virtually 
everything else, that must now at last be abandoned.” pp. 20-21 
 
“The Substance Hypothesis 
The expression ‘theory of value’ has usually been applied in economics to approaches 
that seek to explain the exchangeability of commodities by assuming the existence of 
a quality that endows goods with intrinsic value. The present work will for the most 
part conform to this usage, without, however, losing sight of the fact that, beneath an 
apparently general and neutral name, there lies concealed a quite particular view of 
commodities. In order to distinguish it from other approaches, I shall use the more 
cumbersome – but also more precise – phrase ‘substance theory of value’. 
Historically, as we have seen, two such substances were contemplated by economists: 
labour and utility. In either case one finds the same fundamental belief, namely, that 
in thinking about exchange it is necessary to go beyond the surface appearance of 
commercial transactions in search of a hidden property that is logically prior to such 
transactions and that gives them form. The idea of an objective law of value that 
orders the apparent anarchy of market exchange from without, unbeknownst to market 
actors themselves, has profoundly shaped the way economists look at reality. On this 
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view, exchange exists because there is value – value being understood as the 
distinctive quality of tradeable commodities. 
Léon Walras, in the preface to the fourth edition of his Éléments d’économie 
politique pure (1900), begins by introducing the notion of scarcity: ‘The sum total of 
all things, material and immaterial, on which a price can be set because they are 
scarce (i.e. both useful and limited in quantity), constitutes social wealth.’ Not only is 
scarcity taken to refer to realities that are independent of exchange, namely, the utility 
of things and the limited quantities in which they exist; it is said to confer value on 
objects and, by virtue of this, to form the basis of exchange. The nature of value 
having now been fully characterised in the first part of the Éléments by reference to 
objective criteria, the possibility of exchange logically follows from it; indeed, Walras 
himself makes a point of insisting that exchange is deduced a priori from a specific 
substance, ‘scarcity’ (rareté). Walras goes on in the second part to consider the case 
of the exchange of two commodities for each other, and then in the third the exchange 
of several commodities for one another. He demonstrates that, in a state of 
equilibrium, exchange values are proportional to the relative scarcities of a given set 
of commodities. It is only toward the end, in the sixth part of the treatise, that money 
is introduced. This sequence, from value to barter and then, finally, money, is 
characteristic of the substance hypothesis. 
The labour theory of value finds its fullest expression in the writings of Karl 
Marx. In the opening pages of Das Kapital, Marx considers two commodities, corn 
and iron, and observes that in order for them to be exchanged, ‘a given quantity of 
corn is equated to some quantity of iron.’ This equality, he says, ‘signifies that a 
common element of identical magnitude exists in [these] two different things.’ In 
seeking to identify this common element, he reasons that it ‘cannot be a geometrical, 
physical, chemical or other natural property of commodities.’ Next, he puts to one 
side everything having to do with the ‘use-value’, or utility, of commodities. 
Disregarding this aspect, he concludes that ‘only one property remains, that of being 
products of labour.’ What is more, since ‘human labour-power has been expended to 
produce them’, it is plain that as ‘crystals of this social substance, which is common 
to them all, they are values – commodity values [Warenwerte].’ This common social 
substance is measured by the amount of time that is socially necessary for the 
production of the good: ‘now we know the substance of value. It is labour. We know 
the measure of its magnitude. It is labour-time.’ 
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For Marx, substance value has the status of an a priori principle that focuses 
economic analysis and tells the economist what to look for. It is, in other words, a 
conceptual construction, not an observational fact. Marx does, of course, try to 
persuade his readers that it is enough to carefully examine actual transactions in order 
to perceive the reality of labour value. But his arrangement on this point is hardly 
convincing. Why should utility be rejected as a potential source of value? And even if 
it is rejected, why should there remain only human labour to explain the 
commensurability of commodities? 
These two authors perfectly illustrate, each in his own way, the substance 
hypothesis. Each of them seeks to identify the thing – for Marx, socially necessary 
labour; for Walras, scarcity – that provides the basis for value, and thereby makes 
exchange possible. The appeal of this approach derives precisely from the fact that the 
relevant magnitudes of value for these substances can be calculated without reference 
to the actual transactions. Once the structure of a market economy has been specified 
in terms of production and consumption, it is possible to calculate values for all the 
commodities in it. These commodity values are considered to be objective by both 
Marx and Walras, though in the case of Walras some additional explanation is 
required to the extent that utility involves subjective individual preferences. So long 
as subjective preferences are supposed to be exogenously determined, however, 
nothing distinguishes them from production functions. From the point of view of the 
value theorist, they are perfectly objective assumptions from which commodity value 
can be deduced.” pp.22-25 
 
III. Marx 
“The Fetishism of the Commodity 
At bottom, the substance hypothesis advances a conception of the market based on 
objects and value. Since basic economic facts, such as prices and the volume of 
commodities exchanged, are assumed wholly to rest on the calculation of relative 
values, actors’ relations with one another are thought not to matter, or at least not in 
any important way. This very strong and distinctive assumption justifies us in saying, 
as a general proposition, that both the classical and the neoclassical traditions favour a 
quantitative approach to the study of economic behaviour, while omitting to consider 
the social relations underlying this behaviour. In one sense there is nothing very odd 
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about this way of proceeding. It is, after all, a peculiar feature of market economies 
that isolated individuals come into contact with one another, not directly, but through 
the circulation of commodities. And so it seems natural enough to suppose that it is 
owing to the objectivity of commodity values that producer-traders come to have 
experience of the social world. It seems natural, too, that quantity – how much one 
buys or sells – should be of primary concern to market actors. Value theorists claim to 
faithfully describe the way in which markets appear to operate to the buyers and 
sellers of commodities, who have the impression that values, and changes in values, 
are like a force of nature before which they are powerless. Thus Marx, for example, 
holds that ‘[t]hese magnitudes [of value] vary continually, independently of the will, 
foreknowledge and actions of the exchangers. Their own movement within society 
has for them the form of a movement made by things, and these things, far from being 
under their control, in fact control them.’ But what does it really mean to say that 
objective changes in value are immune to human intervention? Does it somehow 
express an ultimate truth about market economies? 
The most detailed analysis of these questions is due to Marx himself, who 
introduces the notion of the ‘fetishism of the commodity’ in the first chapter of Das 
Kapital. Economic actors, he says, perceive of commodities as ‘autonomous figures 
endowed with a life of their own, which enter into relations both with each other and 
with the human race.’ As against this view, Marx emphasises that value is a social 
fact, specifically produced by market isolation, and in no sense a ‘natural’ quantity. 
He writes: ‘[T]he commodity-form, and the value-relation of the products of labour 
within which it appears, have absolutely no connection with the physical nature of the 
commodity and the material [dinglich] relations arising out of this. It is nothing but 
the defining social relation between men themselves which assumes here, for them, 
the fantastic form of a relation among things.’ For Marx, in the same way that some 
peoples wrongly consider certain objects to possess magical or talismanic 
significance, so too economic actors think of value as belonging exclusively to 
commodities, as a natural or inherent property. Yet even if they fail to perceive the 
true nature of what they see with their own eyes, Marx holds that this way of looking 
at the world is not an illusion. It is part and parcel of how markets work. Value makes 
its way in this world by concealing itself behind the mask of an objective quality that 
is intrinsic to commodities: it ‘does not have its description branded on its forehead.’ 
In other words, the abstraction of value from human labour in the form of 
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commodities is precisely what markets are meant to accomplish. This is what Marx 
meant when he writes: “the categories of bourgeois economics […] are forms of 
thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for the relations of 
production belonging to this historically determined mode of social production, i.e. 
commodity production.’ Antoine Artous glosses this passage as follows: ‘For Marx, 
commodities are ‘suprasensible sensible’ things; forms of thought have a social 
objectivity; and, ultimately, social relations are sustainable only by virtue of the 
concepts that accompany and structure them. Consequently the phenomenon of 
fetishism does not amount to a simple illusion of consciousness, individual or 
collective; nor does it have only to do with the appearance of social relations, with the 
surface of things. It manifests the mode of existence of capitalist relations of 
production, their objective social form.’ 
Yet even if the objectivity of value is what makes markets what they are, Marx 
says, one must never lose sight of the fact that this objectivity is historically the 
product of a certain social structure. Value does not naturally have a certain 
magnitude, or quantity, that results ‘from the nature of the products [being 
exchanged], so that, for instance, one ton of iron and two ounces of gold appear to be 
equal in value, in the same way as a pound of gold and a pound of iron are equal in 
weight, despite their different physical and chemical properties.’ The theorist of value 
must not let himself be fooled by appearances of this sort. In order to avoid falling 
prey to the fetishist illusion, he must never forget that the market form is the 
consequence of a particular, historically determined social relation, which is to say 
market production: ‘Objects of utility become commodities only because they are the 
products of the labour of private individuals who work independently of each other.’ I 
do not disagree, at least insofar as my purpose in this work is to suggest a way of 
looking at value, not as a substance, but as a social and historical institution that forms 
the basis of a market economy. And yet, as against Marx, I maintain that in order to 
do this there is no choice but to break once and for all with the substance hypothesis, 
for otherwise it will be impossible to free ourselves from the hold that the fetishism of 
the commodity has over us, preventing us from recognising the social nature of value. 
I shall have occasion in the chapters that follow to say exactly what this involves. But 
first, it will be necessary to consider a serious objection, namely, that the error of what 
I have set out to do was demonstrated by Marx himself, who, it is said, showed that 
the critique of fetishism and the substance hypothesis are not in fact incompatible. 
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The truth of the matter, however, as we shall we see, is that Marx’s commitment to 
the labour theory of value led him, in spite of himself, to argue against his own socio-
historical principles. 
The attempt to reconcile the conceptions of value as a substance and as a 
social institution runs up against insuperable obstacles from the first. To suppose that 
a property such as labour or utility, which by its nature is eternal and everlasting, can 
be made to support a historically contingent interpretation of value involves us in a 
quandary from which there is no escape. The substance hypothesis is perfectly 
consistent, on the other hand, with the idea that there has always been a market 
economy, just as there has always been economic value – in the one case owing to the 
practical necessity of labour, to which human beings are permanently condemned in 
order to earn their livelihood, and in the other to the perpetual search for useful goods, 
of which they will always have need. In both cases a naturalistic conception of 
economic activity takes precedence over a historical approach. This is a perfectly 
defensible position, but it is not the one that Marx himself claims to defend. Indeed, 
Marx’s allegiance to the substance hypothesis puts him in the awkward position of 
appearing to contradict himself, for he is misled by his own analysis of the 
quantitative determination of labour value to embrace a transhistorical theory. Thus, 
for example, because socially necessary labour-time is a quantity that can be 
calculated for every product, regardless of the relations of production, he makes the 
mistake of regarding it as a naturally occurring, or fixed, quantity; that is, as a 
quantity unaffected by social relations whose calculation makes no reference to 
commercial terms of exchange. In other words, it is exactly the sort of calculation 
carried out in a non-market society. Plainly, then, Marx’s critique of fetishism cannot 
be seen as an integral part of the quantitative determination of labour value. It appears 
instead as an adjunct to the main argument on this point, in the fourth chapter of Das 
Kapital, where it is introduced as a sort of precautionary measure, to provide an 
exogenous specification of labour value.  
No one has commented more insightfully on the tension in Marx’s thinking 
between these two antagonistic tendencies than the philosopher and economist 
Cornelius Castoriadis. Its origin, Castoriadis argues, may be traced to the very notion 
of a substance, which signifies a quality ‘endowed with absolute significance’, 
something that ‘has always existed, forever [until now] and forever more.’ This 
amounts to asserting the existence of causal factors that obtain universally, without 
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regard to any particular set of social relations. ‘[T]he antinomy of Marx’s thought’, 
Castoriadis observes, ‘is that the Labour that modifies all things, and itself a 
constantly modified [in its turn], is at the same time conceived as a kind of 
Substance/Essence, as something that remains unalterable […], [that] is not modified, 
[that] is not altered, [that] endures as the immutable foundation of changing attributes 
and determinants.’ Castoriadis reminds us that Marx himself imagines Robinson 
Crusoe, on his island, keeping account of the time he has spent satisfying his various 
needs, with the ultimate purpose of allocating this time in proportion to ‘the 
magnitude of the difficulties to be overcome in attaining the useful effect aimed at.’ 
Economists today would say that Crusoe was trying to maximise his utility. 
Marx goes on to say this about Robinson’s calculations: ‘His stock-book 
contains a catalogue […] of the labour-time that specific quantities of these products 
have on average cost him […]. [T]hose relations contain all the essential determinants 
of value.’ Here labour value stands revealed as a transhistorical category that imposes 
itself on the individual and markets alike. This will also be the case, Marx adds, in a 
society organised on Communist principles, in which ‘[a]ll the characteristics of 
Robinson’s labour are repeated […] but with the difference that they are social 
instead of individual.’ Note that the historically determined dimension of value, which 
Marx frequently claims to be emblematic of market production, is absent here. 
Reviewing the many instances of this unceasing oscillation between two poles, 
Castoriadis observers that Marx ‘conceives of Substance Labour sometimes as 
physiological-natural and sometimes as fully social, sometimes are transhistorical and 
sometimes as specifically associated with the capitalist phase, sometimes as a 
manifestation of the reification of humanity under capitalist exploitation and 
sometimes as the foundation for a ‘rational calculus’ in the future society [he 
envisions].’ He emphatically concludes: The true historical limitation in both Aristotle 
and Marx is [bound up with] the question of institution[s], the inability of received 
wisdom to take the sociohistorical into account as a mode of being that cannot be 
reduced to what is ‘known’ elsewhere.’ In other words, the substance approach is 
bound to ignore value as a social institution because it supposes it has shown this 
view to be inadequate to justify an interpretation of economic behaviour in terms of 
the social relations that historically have produced it. If we are to remain faithful to 
the sociohistorical conception of market economies, as I urge that we do, it will be 
necessary to jettison the substance hypothesis. Otherwise there is no way out from the 
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contradiction that arises regarding value as a substance, universal and everlasting in 
its effect, and at the same time regarding it as something that is exclusively associated 
with a market regime.” pp. 40-47 
 
IV. Durkheim 
“Value is not an inherent property of commodities; it is an idea that springs from the 
multitude, as Spinoza would say, and whose effects on economic behaviour come to 
be felt by all the members of society. One of the strengths of this way of looking at 
money is that it is not limited to economics alone; it may be found in the works of 
many writers on sociology as well, notably among them, as we shall soon see, Émile 
Durkheim. Once the substance hypothesis is rejected it becomes possible to develop a 
more general explanation of value that includes economic activity as a special case. 
The significance of this cannot be overstated: a genuine reformation of economics, it 
seems to me, must humbly affirm its identity as one among a number of other social 
sciences by accepting that economic facts are social facts like any other; that social 
reality does not possess some essential property which licenses a distinct 
epistemology and justifies the creation of an independent discipline of study. All the 
social sciences, I maintain, are subject to the same logic of explanation. One may 
expect considerable advances to be made with the adoption of what might be called a 
unidisciplinary perspective – starting with economics itself, which as a captive of the 
doctrine of substance value, has long encountered difficulties in making sense of 
capitalism.” pp.194-195 
 
“Chapter Five – A New Approach to Value 
Like any other kind of value, whether religious, aesthetic, moral, or social, economic 
value has a judgmental aspect involving the power exerted by individuals and 
commodities. Thus, for example, aesthetic value is a recognition of the degree of 
influence enjoyed by certain artists or works of art. The main question that values 
pose to the social sciences is both fundamental and puzzling, for it has to do with their 
objectivity, without which there could be no values in the strict sense of the term, only 
a scattered mass of subjective opinions. Durkheim, referring to value judgements of 
the type ‘This man has high moral value; this picture has great aesthetic value; this 
jewel is worth so much’, notes that ‘[i]n all these instances I attribute to the people or 
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things in question an objective character quite independent of my own individual 
feelings at the time of making the judgment […]. All these values exist then, in a 
sense, outside of me.’ What is more, value involves a capacity for arousing desire. 
‘What has value is in some way good; what is good is desired, and all desire is a 
psychological state”, he observes. ‘Nevertheless the values under discussion have the 
objectivity of things. How can these two characteristics, which at first blush appear 
contradictory, be reconciled? How, in fact, can a state of feeling be independent of the 
subject that feels it?’ 
If the kinship of economic value to its cousins in the social sciences is 
admitted (‘Certainly there are different types of value’, Durkheim remarks, ‘but they 
are all species of the same genus’), it seems all the more curious that economics 
should have developed as a separate and virtually autonomous discipline. Economists 
devised an utterly original theoretical framework that asserted the objectivity of 
economic value and traced its source to the existence of a social substance, variously 
identified with either labour or utility, having a measurable magnitude or quantity. On 
the basis of this, as we have seen, a quantitative tradition of analysis grew up in 
opposition to sociological reasoning whose chief characteristic is that it allows no 
place for collective perceptions and beliefs. A more drastic rupture can hardly be 
imagined. 
In reaffirming the existence of a common law of value that applies to all the 
social sciences, I hope to be able to show that the type of value contemplated by 
economists, despite its mathematical appearance, is in fact a kind of social power – a 
power over things that takes the form of an ability to purchase things, arising from the 
universal desire for liquidity. The precise nature of this power is nonetheless unclear. 
How can a longing from something be externalised so that it comes lastingly to be 
associated with an object? This question has been considered at length by the other 
social sciences, relying on the notions of confidence, common emotion, power of the 
multitude, and collective beliefs” pp.197-198 
 
“The suggestion that economic value is a power that originates in the beliefs of a 
community of people, through the sharing of ideas and emotions, borders on heresy in 
a discipline where, with rare exceptions, only the willed actions of individuals are 
recognised. And yet the reality of collective belief is incontestable. Not only does it 
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form the basis of social reality and, in particular, the institution of money; without 
collective belief, no unified explanation of value would be possible.” p.208 
 
“Durkheim’s Theory of Value 
The idea that social groups support an altogether distinctive form of mental activity, 
one that possesses a dynamism and an authority not found in isolated individuals, is a 
constant theme in all of Émile Durkheim’s writings. Durkheim does not use the term 
“common emotion” (affect commun), but when he speaks of collective feelings or 
beliefs it is exactly this that he has in mind. It occupies a crucial place in sociological 
analysis, he says, because it is the foundation of social values and the source of their 
authority: 
 
When individual minds are not isolated but enter into close relation with and 
work upon each other, from their synthesis arises a new kind of psychic life. It 
is clearly distinguished by its peculiar intensity from that led by the solitary 
individual. Sentiments born and developed in the group have a greater energy 
than purely individual sentiments […]. 
It is, in fact, at such moments of collective ferment that are born the 
greatest of ideals upon which civilisations rest. The periods of creation or 
renewal occur when men for various reasons are led into closer relationship 
with each other, when reunions and assemblies are most frequent, 
relationships better maintained and the exchange of ideas most active […]. 
To see society only as an organised body of vital function is to 
diminish it, for this body has a soul which is the composition of collective 
ideals. Ideals are not abstractions, cold intellectual concepts lacking in 
efficient power. They are essentially dynamic, for behind them are the 
powerful forces of the collective. They are collective forces […]. The ideal 
itself is a force of this nature. 
 
This is a remarkable passage. Everything that is thought and felt in common, 
Durkheim says, comes to exert a transformative influence over individual minds. 
What he calls effervescence – the ferment of ideas and emotions that occurs when 
individual minds are placed in communion with one another – brings about the 
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emergence of moral life and collective ideals. These ‘real and active forces’, produced 
by concerted mental activity, are nothing other that what I join Spinoza in calling the 
power of the multitude. Durkheim emphasises, moreover that such forces – also 
known as collective representations – are indeed properly spoken of as forces, not as 
‘abstractions’ or ‘cold intellectual concepts’. For they are indissociably bound up with 
the metamorphosis undergone by the individual in becoming a social being, which is 
to say a person who conforms to certain shared habits of thought and behaviour. This 
transformation is not the product of a deliberate choice or reasoned conviction. It 
arises instead from the harnessing of individual desires by a power greater than the 
individual, so that each person models his own longing on that of the multitude, on its 
common emotion. The process by which this emotion appears, this condition of 
feeling and responding in unison, recalls the dynamic of imitation we considered 
earlier in which each person adapts his behaviour in response to what others think and 
do. In other words, collective feeling is not a simple summing up of individual 
sentiments. It results instead from a kind of mimetic resonance: 
 
An outburst of collective emotion in a gathering does not merely express the 
sum total of what individual feelings share in common, but is something of a 
very different order […]. It is a product of shared existence, of actions and 
reactions called into play between the consciousnesses of individuals. If it is 
echoed in each one of them it is precisely by virtue of the special energy 
derived from its collective origins. If all hearts beat in unison, this is not a 
consequence of a spontaneous, pre-established harmony; it is because one and 
the same force is propelling them in the same direction. Each one is borne 
along by the rest. 
 
It is this power of the multitude that makes social life possible. Durkheim illustrates 
the transition to an ordered community of individuals by analogy with the hierarchical 
succession of nature’s kingdoms: mineral, animal, human. Anticipating one aspect of 
the modern theory of complex dynamic systems, he notes that, in passing from one 
realm to the next, new properties emerge that are unknown in the lower phyla, even 
though members of the higher phyla have come into being only through the 
combination of elements belonging to the lower ones. ‘The living cell contains 
nothing save chemical particles […] [and yet] it is very clearly impossible for the 
 83 
characteristic phenomena of life to reside in atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon and 
nitrogen […]. [Life] is in the whole and not in the parts’. At each stage, in moving 
from matter to life, and then from life to consciousness – which is to say from the 
physical to the biological, and then from the biological to the mental – a new quality 
appears that radically distinguishes each kingdom from the one that came before it. 
Durkheim conceives of the emergence of society in the same manner: society is to the 
individual as the mental realm is to the biological and the biological to the physical. 
The autonomy of the social kingdom, its irreducibility to individual minds, follows 
directly from this. Although society is composed solely of human beings, its 
properties are not fewer in number that the sum total of individual properties, but 
greater: ‘[T]his synthesis sui generis, which constitutes every society, gives rise to 
new phenomena, different from those which occur in consciousnesses in isolation 
[…].’ 
But which emergent properties characterise the social kingdom? What is the 
expression of this new degree of complexity that follows upon the transition from 
matter to life, and from life to consciousness? To answer these questions we first need 
to ask what sociology is a science of. The claim that society is irreducible either to the 
individuals who compose it, or to biology or physics, implies that the discipline of 
sociology is logically independent of psychology, just as psychology was able to 
demonstrate its autonomy in relation to biology, and biology in relation to physics. 
Durkheim was so keenly aware of the importance of determining the exact scope and 
purpose of sociology that he devoted the entire first chapter of his great work, Les 
règles de la méthode sociologique (1895), to this question. Sociology, he says, 
‘embraces one single, well-defined group of phenomena’ – social facts. ‘A social fact 
is identifiable through the power of external coercion which it exerts or is capable of 
exerting upon individuals.’ It is this incomparable force – what elsewhere he calls 
‘moral authority’ – that transforms the isolated individuals of neoclassical economic 
theory into social beings, by creating among them a common sense of belonging. 
Without this feeling, society could not exist. Our experience of social life is, by 
definition, the experience of a power that is larger than ourselves and that brings us 
together. From this it follows that ‘[t]he problem for sociology – if it can be said that 
there is one sociological problem – is to search through the various forms of external 
constraint for the various kinds of corresponding moral authority, and to discover 
their causes.’ The error of seeking to explain social behaviour exclusively with 
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reference to the contents of individual minds – an extreme form of methodological 
individualism that Durkheim vigorously rejects – arises from a failure to recognise 
that, because the pressure of social facts is exerted on individual wills, it cannot be 
derived from them. ‘The authority to which the individual bows when he acts, thinks, 
or feels socially dominates him to such a degree because it is product of forces which 
transcend him and for which he consequently cannot account. It is not from within 
himself that can come the external pressure which he undergoes […].’ It is for this 
reason, Durkheim says, that: 
 
Society is not the mere sum of individuals, but the system formed by their 
association represents a specific reality which has its own characteristics. 
Undoubtedly no collective entity can be produced if there are no individual 
consciousnesses: this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. In addition, 
these consciousnesses must be associated and combined, but combined in a 
certain way. It is from this combination that social life arises and consequently 
it is this combination which explains it. By aggregating together, individuals 
give birth to a being, psychical if you will, but one which constitutes a 
psychical individuality of a new kind […]. The group thinks, feels and acts 
entirely differently from the way its members would if they were isolated. 
 
The affinity between what Durkheim calls moral authority, arising from the fusion of 
individuals into a unified group, and what I call the power of the multitude is plain. 
They are both corollaries of a single principle, namely that social life is the product of 
powerful forces of sentiment and emotion that shape individual behaviours. These 
forces exhibit the peculiar property of being able to be invested in objects and, by 
virtue of this, of being able to transmit to objects a part of their power. This is the 
phenomenon that Marx calls fetishism” pp.209-214 
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